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I
INTRODUCTION

Many of the fundamental decisions about immigration reform in this country
hinge on questions of numbers. How many illegal aliens are there? How many
might qualify for this or that amnesty date or for permanent work permits? If
amnestied aliens send for relatives, what might be the rate of exponential immigration growth? If an estimated 60% or more of all deportable aliens are of Mexican
origin would a similar percentage show up in the number of aliens that might be
legalized? Should Mexico be given a special high number of immigration visas to
help absorb illegal entrants? If local governments should be compensated for social
assistance costs resulting from a legalization program, on what estimated numbers
should such compensation be based? If illegal aliens are "undocumented" taxpayers and make less use of social assistance, as some pro-amnesty groups claim,
how should that consideration be weighed quantitatively into a compensation
formula?
These and other related questions are of such magnitude that they justify a
broad survey of what is known, or not known, about illegal alien numbers in the
United States. This study seeks to provide just such a global picture of the controversial subject by tracking the development of the "numbers game" in a loosely
chronological frame. Within that structure, the topic is subdivided into several
major areas of interest.
Section II provides a brief history of how, in the early 1970's, illegal aliens first
came to be seen as a "numbers problem" as legislators sought some statistical guidance on what to do about "undocumented" workers and residents. This section
suggests how the "politics" of the numbers game first emerged. Section III
describes initial responses to the numbers problem by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Subsequent sections describe the emergence of a new and
flourishing field of research and speculation concerning the number of illegal
aliens. The methodologies into which such studies can be conveniently divided are
also suggested, for example, analytical/residual estimates in section IV, speculative
estimates in section V, 1 and socioeconomic profiles of illegal aliens in section VI.2
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I. The methodological problems inherent in any attempt to size up "hidden populations" are conve-
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Section VII looks at the numbers game from the Mexican side of the river, which
is important because data from below the border is a fundamental source of information for demographers and social scientists seeking to measure the migration of
"undocumented" Spanish language groups. Of course, in the interest of brevity,
some studies of the number of illegal aliens in the United States could not be
considered in this survey.
Section VIII includes an account of the controversy surrounding the 1980
Census and its findings. The census is an integral part of the development of the
disputatious numbers game, mainly because of its importance in formulating representation and welfare state policies. Finally, section IX describes the legislative
dilemma resulting from a lack of firm statistical information on the size of the
illegal alien population.
II
"How

MANY ARE WE TALKING ABOUT COMMISSIONER?"-THE
EMERGENCE OF THE "NUMBERS GAME"

By 1965 the Johnson administration (1963-1968), under the banner theme of
the Great Society, had committed a then-affluent nation to a domestic war on
poverty. 3 Just as Great Society programs began to reduce the mobility and job
TABLE 1
DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED FOR FISCAL YEARS
JULY 1 TO JUNE 30
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
SoUrCe:

86,597
110,371
139,520
161,608
212,057
283,557
345,353

IMMIGRATION

RALIZATION

SERVICE,

AND

NATU-

U.S.

DEP'T

OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT Ta-

bles 27B & 33 (1964-1970).
niently summarized in U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS IN ESTIMATING
THE SIZE OF THE ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY (1980) (prepared at the request of Sen. Alan Simpson).
2. A guide to other academic works that seek to assess the socioeconomic impact of "undocumented"
immigrants may be found in J. VIALET, ILLEGAL ALIENS: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND (1977) (available

from Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress with updates). See also STAFF OF SELECT
COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG.,

1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT:

U.S. IMMI-

GRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as SCIRP FINAL
REPORT); U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:

APPENDIX E TO STAFF REPORT OF

THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, PAPERS ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION TO THE

UNITED STATES AND APPENDICES (1980) (Supplement to SCIRP FINAL REPORT) [hereinafter cited as
Appendix E to SCIRP FINAL REPORT].

3. Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1965 PUB. PAPERS
1-9 (Jan. 4); Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan, 1964 PUB. PAPERS 704-06 (May
22).
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needs of various sectors of the American labor force, and as America's manpower
became increasingly committed to an undeclared war in Vietnam, the Mexican
contract labor program (also known as the Bracero program) was allowed to lapse.
American contractors and employers, encountering this war on two fronts, increasingly turned to illegal labor from Mexico and other countries. This is roughly
indicated by the rapid rise in the number of illegal aliens apprehended by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Since the INS concentrated most of its enforcement personnel in areas bordering on Mexico, from 80% to 90% of the apprehensions involved Mexican
4
nationals, many of them "repeaters" seeking seasonal jobs in the United States.
But immigration directors and investigators in the district offices of the interior
were also keenly aware that non-Mexican illegals were slipping into the country in
ever larger numbers, usually as tourists and visitors arriving on international airflights, or through other sophisticated smuggling channels. One had only to look
around at the new alien labor force in American cities to find visible proof that the
5
control problem was no longer strictly a Mexican border problem.
A surge of complaints reached Congress that illegal aliens and "new-style wetbacks" were undermining Great Society job training programs for America's disadvantaged minorities, and were nullifying efforts to unionize farm labor and
certain jobs in the secondary labor market, such as garment workers. 6 Employers
were accused of greedily using cheap immigrant labor to break strikes, and to
7
depress wages and working conditions.
In 1971 the House Judiciary Committee and its Subcommittee on Immigration, under Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., began the most extensive series of
hearings ever held on the subject of illegal aliens. 8 The hearings took place all over
the country and focused national attention not only on the growing problems of
illegal aliens in America's economy and society, but also on the need for penalties
against the employers of such aliens. Twice, in 1972 and 1975, so-called Rodino
bills providing for "preventive" solutions to illegal entries and settlements were
approved by the House of Representatives. Both bills were blocked by the Senate
Judiciary Committee then headed by Senator James 0. Eastland, who was himself
a user of cheap alien labor on his Mississippi plantations. 9
4.

See

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT

Tables 30 & 33 1964-70.
5. See State of Illinois, Legislative Investigating Commission, Report to the GeneralAssembly on the Illegal
Mexican Alien Problem in Illinois (1971); Portes, Return of the Wetback, SOCIETY Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 40, 40-46;
Wetbacks Are Headingfor the Cities, Houston Post, July 27, 1969 at 12, col. 1.
6. Illegal Aliens." HearingsBefore Subcomm. No. / of the House Comm. on theJudiiaqy, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. (1971-1972) (five parts) [hereinafter cited as Rodino Hearings].
7. In particular, Cesar Chavez, head of the United Farm Workers, affiliated with the AFL-CIO, popularized the charge that employers were using illegal aliens as strike breakers. See Review of the Administration
of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International
Law of the House Comm. on theJudicia4y, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 155-60 (1973).
8. Rodino Hearings,supra note 6.
9. See Controversy Over Proposals to Reduce the Number of Illegal Aliens, CONG. DIG., Jan. 1975, at 1, 1-32;
Corwin, A Stoty of Ad Hoc Exemptions, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN
LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 136, 136-75 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
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The Rodino hearings highlighted the unavailability of firm estimates based on
empirical research or actual head counts of illegal alien workers or residents. The
Central Office of the INS could only provide apprehension statistics, which were of
limited use. Otherwise the INS had only a hazy notion of how many illegals might
have settled into jobs or established households.' 0
Nevertheless, the hapless INS was pushed by Congress to come up with an
estimate of the number of foreign nationals illegally in the United States. Commissioner of Immigration Raymond Farrell, who wished to maintain the appearance
that his administration (January 1962 to April 1973) had immigration matters
under control, did not press Congress or the President's Office of Management and
Budget for more manpower or documentary control facilities. He finally reluctantly admitted in 1972 that there could possibly be 1,000,000 illegals in the
country. I1
Farrell's figure was a "guesstimate" done after a hasty consultation with district directors who were unsure whether the estimate was limited to illegal workers,
or also included family members. Meanwhile, INS arrest figures surged upwards,
paralleled by public complaints about illegal aliens, as can be seen in appendix A
and in table 2.
TABLE

2

DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED FOR FISCAL YEARS
JULY 1 TO JUNE

1971
1972
1973
1974

30

Mexican

Other

348,406
430,211
576,807
709,945

64,406
61,978
70,705
71,046

SoUrCe: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN-

NUAL REPORT Tables 27B
1974).

& 30

(1971-

In late 1973 the Nixon administration appointed an enforcement-minded
Commissioner of Immigration, Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., a former Marine Corps
general. General Chapman expressed his alarm about the inability of an understaffed immigration service to contain the flow of illegal aliens into the American
labor market and into American communities. He found the Service so
10. The INS lacked, and still lacks, research capabilities and a modern documentary control system.
For instance, it has never known how many legally admitted immigrants and nonimmigrants return to
their home country. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES: CONTROLS OVER NONIMMIGRANTS REMAIN INEFFECTIVE (1980); see also 20
Mllion A4ltns Lost'in US Maze, Chicago Trib., Nov. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (report on the inability of an
understaffed INS to keep track of millions of foreign visitors) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Tribune].
11. Rodino Hearings, supra note 6, at 1323-25; U.S. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY STAFF
REPORT/DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE, LABOR AND STATE 384 (1979).
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undermanned and so underfunded, and its equipment so outmoded, that it could
perform only minimal service and enforcement functions. In other words, there
was a logistical problem.
3

TABLE

IMMIGRATION SERVICE RESOURCES
Fiscal Year

1971

1972

1973

Total personnel of INS
Total INS budget (in millions of $)

7,230
121.9

6,682
130.9

6,682
137.5

Note:
Source:

Apprehension and budget figures may vary.
IMMIGRATION

AND

NATURALIZATION

SERVICE,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF JUSTICE,

ANNUAL

REPORT Tables 23, 27B (1971-1973); Hearings Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State, ofthe
House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, 788 (1971); id., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1,
948 (1972); id. 93d Cong,, 1st Sess. Pt. 1 (1973); id 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 4, 628-719 (1976);
Immigration and NaturalizationRegional Oftce OperationsHearings Before the Subcomm. on Legal andMonetag Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-74); Correspondence with Statistics Division, Central Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Washington, D.C.

Meanwhile, estimates of illegal aliens actually residing in the United States
took a quantum leap. In October 1974, Attorney General William Saxbe, after
touring the Mexican border and communities deluged with aliens, estimated the
number of illegal residents to be at least between 4,000,000 and 7,000,000 and
probably higher. At the same time, Commissioner Chapman, who was trying to
drum up public support and appropriations for enforcement of immigration laws
and inspection standards, spoke ominously of a "Silent Invasion" and gave a rough
12
estimate of from 4,000,000 to 12,000,000 illegal residents.
The numbers game had acquired a political character which has dominated
estimates of illegal aliens, whether high or low, ever since. Neither the Commissioner of Immigration, nor his superior, the Attorney General, had any clear idea
as to what nationalities composed the estimates, although immigration officials
commonly figured that from 60% to 75% of all illegal resident aliens were Mexicans and other Hispanics. 13 Accused (by Chicano and other Hispanic leaders) of
using exaggerated "racist estimates" in order to justify an immigration crackdown
on disadvantaged minorities 14 and pressed by Congress and the administration for
12. See Chapman, Illegal Aliens. Time to Call a Halt!, READER'S DIG., Oct. 1976, at 186, 186-92; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1974, at 26, col. I (Chapman was reported to have said that the illegal alien population
was at least 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 and might be as high as 10,000,000 or 12,000,000; see also W. FOGEL,
MEXICAN ILLEGAL WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (Institute of Industrial Relations Monograph

No. 20, 1978).
13. See Immigration 1976. Hearings on S 3074 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturahzation of the
Senate Comm. on the Judciay, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]; Corwin,
Quien Sabe, Mexican Migration Statistics, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN
LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 108, 125-30 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
14. Statements by Mexican, Chicano, and Anglo-American delegates at a symposium, Immigration and
Pubhc Pohcy." The Humanistic Imperative, sponsored by Chicano Training Center of Houston, University of
Houston, in April 1977; see also Maz6n, Illegal Alen Surrogates.- A PsychohistoricalInterpretation of Group Stereotyping in Times of Economic Stress, 6 AZTLAN-INT'L J. CHICANO STUD. RESEARCH 305, 305-13, 318-21
(1975); Illegal Ahins and Scapegoats, Wall St. J., May 2, 1977, at 12, col. 1.
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more precise estimates, Chapman and other INS officials decided that it was time
for the INS to search out more precise, objective estimates.
III
INS
A.

ESTIMATES OF DEPORTABLE ALIENS,

1975-1976,

AND THEIR USE

General INS Surveys

Prior to Commissioner Chapman's administration, the INS had never sponsored any serious research on immigrant populations or flows. Congress had never
mandated this, nor had congressional appropriations provided for it. Nevertheless,
Chapman decided that if Congressional committees were to be provided with
needed information about the dynamics of the new waves of immigration, the INS
would have to promote outside research and, to whatever extent was possible,
develop its own research capabilities. Hereafter, the INS would take an active role
in assessing the problems that it was charged with solving.' 5
As a first step, the INS contracted with Lesko Associates, a research firm, to do
an independent survey of the number of illegal residents in the United States as of
1975. A panel of immigration experts and academicians, some of them associated
with newly created ethnic study centers, was asked to estimate the total number of
illegal aliens, and the subtotal of Mexican illegals.
Unknown to one another, the panelists evaluated each other's estimates in
followup questionnaires. The estimates ranged from 2,000,000 to 12,000,000
depending on whether the panelists primarily considered the number of illegal
workers or the number of workers plus family dependents. The results were averaged and announced in October 1975 as follows: 8,200,000 illegal residents in all,
6
of which 5,200,000 were thought to be Mexicans.'
The technique used by Lesko Associates for this survey is known as the Delphi
technique and has been described as "iterative informed guesswork.' 7 Both the
technique and the results of the survey were the subject of scathing criticism by
professional demographers. For one thing, panelists provided no systematic
rationale for their estimates. For another, the panel was not balanced. Certain
experts were left out, or refused to participate.' 8
In fairness to Lesko Associates and the INS, however, Commissioner Chapman
never intended the project to be more than a preliminary survey of expert opinion
15. See Guss, Even IfYou're on the Right Track, You'll Get Run Over ifYou Just Sit There, INS REP. 51, 53
(1977).
16. Lesko Associates, Final Report: Basic Data and Guidance Required to Implement a Major Illegal
Alien Study During Fiscal Year 1976, 2-3, 12, 15-16 (1975) (prepared for Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS).
17. See Siegel, Passel & Robinson, PreliminaryReview of Exiting Studies of the Numbers of Illegal Residents in
the United States, in Appendix to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 13, 16-17 (report prepared for
SCIRP by U.S. Census Bureau demographers) [hereinafter cited as Siegel].
18. For critiques of the Lesko survey, see Keely, Counting the Uncountable. Estimates of Undocumented Aliens
in the United States , 3 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 447, 447-78 (1977); K. Roberts, M. Conroy, A. King, &J.
Rizo-Patron, The Mexican Numbers Game: An Analysis of the Lesko Estimate of Undocumented Migration from Mexico to the United States, Research Report (Apr. 1978) (available from Bureau of Business
Research, University of Texas at Austin).
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confirming the existence of a serious alien problem in the nation, and pointing the
way toward needed empirical studies of illegal aliens. The survey served both of
these purposes very well.
A second step toward a general survey of the size of the illegal alien population
was taken when Commissioner Chapman ordered the district directors to make a
careful estimate by a consensus method of the number of aliens, including family
dependents, working or residing illegally in each district.19 Each district director
gathered estimates primarily from his regular staff of experienced investigators,
but in some cases supplemented by estimates from border patrol agents, immigrant inspectors, and local law enforcement authorities. Most of these officers
worked daily in immigrant communities and were considered to be the closest
thing to "field experts" best able to judge numbers. District officials also considered, in varying degrees, apprehension statistics for illegals captured in transit, in
residence, or at a place of employment, as well as rough estimates of escape ratios
20
and voluntary return rates to the home country.
The district-by-district survey came up with a consensus of estimates for each
district, resulting in a total estimate of 5,500,000 to 6,000,000 illegal aliens in the
United States as of late 1975.21 These results were presented to Congressional committees in early 1976.22 While Census Bureau demographers criticized the 1975
INS survey as lacking any statistical methodology other than "synthetic speculation, ' 23 the survey, for all its lack of uniform procedures, may still be the most
realistic estimate by experienced people of the illegal alien population for a given
date. The results are included in table 4.
As the recession deepened and the American economy headed toward a nine
percent unemployment rate, the Ford administration (1974-1976), worried about
immigrant competition in a shrinking job market and public reaction, declared
illegal aliens a "national problem. ' 24 The administration and Congress now
urgently wanted statistics on illegal workers. Seeing the recession as an opportune
time to substantiate the need for immigration reform and increased INS funding,
Commissioner Chapman urged district directors to make a survey of employed
illegal aliens similar to the 1975 district-by-district estimates of illegal alien residents. 25 Field offices were also directed to collect, tabulate, and circulate wage and
employment data on illegal aliens, as seen below in section VI, Socioeconomic
Profiles of Illegal Aliens.
19. Telephone interview with Robert Anderson, Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS (Oct. 13,
1981); Telephone interview with Edwin Chauvin, Jr., Chairman, Association of Immigration Directors,
New Orleans (Nov. 13, 1981).
20. Id
21. Id
22. 1976 Hearings, supra note 13, at 39-41.
23. Keely, supra note 18, at 474-75; Siegel, supra note 17, at 17.
24. See Corwin & Fogel, Shadow Labor Force, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON
MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO.THE UNITED STATES 257, 280-82 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
25. For a critique of Chapman's estimates and his motivations, see Keely, supra note 18, at 477. See
also Keely, The Shadows of Invisible People.- Estimating the Number of Illegal Migrants, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS,
Mar. 1980, at 24, 26-29.
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TABLE

4

ESTIMATED TOTAL NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS BY IMMIGRATION
DISTRICTS,
Western Region
Honolulu
Los Angeles
Phoenix
San Francisco

1975
1,500
1,350,000
50,000
220,000

-

Southern Region
Atlanta
El Paso
Houston
Miami
New Orleans
San Antonio

75,000
75,000
525,000
360,000
40,000
310,000

-

Northern Region
Anchorage
Chicago
Cleveland
Denver
Detroit
Helena
Kansas City
Omaha
Portland, Ore.
St. Paul
Seattle

600
375,000
75,000
30,000
50,000
2,000
10,000
6,000
25,000
6,000
10,000

-

Eastern Regon
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Hartford
Newark
New York
Philadelphia
Portland, Me.
San Juan
St. Albans
Washington, D.C.

60,000
10,000
10,000
7,000
. 275,000
1,350,000
80,000
3,000
10,000
500
50,000

-

-

70,000
15,000
15,000
8,000
300,000
1,500,000
90,000
3,000
15,000
600
60,000

Estimated Total

5,451,600

-

5,989,900

-

-

-

-

-

1,600
1,500,000
55,000
240,000
80,000
80,000
550,000
380,000
50,000
330,000
700
400,000
80,000
35,000
60,000
3,000
12,000
7,000
30,000
7,000
12,000

Source: Immigration 1976- Hearingson S 3074 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalizationof
the Senatejudiciagy Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41 (1976).

By the astute use of plausible statistical estimates, and a whirlwind public relations campaign that explained the control problem and immigration needs to powerful lobbying groups such as the American Legion and the AFL/CIO,
Commissioner Chapman, with assistance from understanding Congressmen, was
able to bring about a considerable improvement in the pathetic resources of the
INS. Chapman was able to achieve an increase in the total number of authorized
personnel for the INS and annual budget increases from 1974 to 1977. As the INS
budget grew so did apprehension totals, as shown in table 5.
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TABLE

5

ALIEN ARRESTS AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE RESOURCES
Fiscal Year
Total
Total
Total
Total

alien apprehensions
Mexican apprehensions
personnel of INS t
INS budget (Millions of $)

1974

1975

1976

1977

788,145
709,959
7,982
155.2

766,600*
680,392
8,082
181.3

866,433
781,438
8,882
213.6

1,042,215
954,778
9,473
245.0

Depth of economic recession, apprehensions down.
tAuthorized positions but not always filled for lack of funding.
Note: Apprehension and budget figures may vary.
Source:

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL

REPORT Tables 23, 27B (1974-1977); Data from Statistical Division, Central Office,
INS. With a new alien rush underway following the amnesty promises of 1977 by
President Carter, INS personnel numbered 10,071 in fiscal 1978 and the INS budget
totaled $266 million.
The resources and responsibilities of the INS should be compared to other federal
agencies. For example, the FBI in fiscal 1978 had $500 million and 19,000
employees, and the Environmental Protection Agency $849 million and 10,200
employees.

Chapman had hoped for more. Yet, taking into account rampant inflation
and the overwhelming demands on immigration services and enforcement functions during his administration, he left the INS relatively well-off in fiscal 1977
compared to fiscal 1974, as seen in appendix B, INS: Staffing Levels Since Fiscal
Year 1977.
B.

Fraudulent Entrants Study of 1975

In September 1975, Commissioner Chapman established a Social Science
Research Branch in the Office of Planning and Evaluation of the INS. Through
this office, no longer operational, the INS for the first and only time thus far sponsored a major research program for the study of illegal aliens and related enforce26
ment needs.
The first studies conducted under the new research program were enforcement
experiments funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. They
were designed to suggest the size of the illegal alien flow through data collected
from both electronic sensors along the Mexican border and from various deploy27
Part of
ment patterns of border patrol squadrons along common crossing points.
the design included a Fraudulent Entrants Study. Because this steidy was the first
serious effort to measure empirically the illegal flow of documented aliens through
26. This project was done in consultation with David S. North, an immigration and labor-use specialist who is now Vice President of the New Transcentury Foundation, a nonprofit research and consultant firm, and with the special assistance of Marion Houstoun, now with the Economic Research
Division of the U.S. Dept. of Labor. Telephone interview with Marion Houstoun, Immigration Staff Specialist, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Nov. 14, 1981).
27. Telephone interview with Robert Anderson, supra note 19.
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inspection points, and because its findings are virtually the only sound basis for
current estimates and guesses as to the size of this flow, the Fraudulent Entrants
Study deserves special attention from immigration students.
1. Methodology and Results
The flow study was designed to provide statistically valid estimates of illegal
aliens and aliens with mala fide intentions who passed through ports of entry on
the Mexican border and through the largest international airports in the United
28
States.
Three groups of illegal entrants were studied; first, those attempting entry with
counterfeit or altered documents; second, imposters, using false verbal or documented claims to American citizenship; and, third, those presenting valid documents, such as a tourist visa, a border-shopping card, or a student visa, the terms of
which the bearer intended to violate after entry, usually by taking a job. Additionally, the Fraudulent Entrants Study sought information on the characteristics
29
of fraudulent entries by time, place, and techniques used.
The study, prepared mainly by researcher David S. North of the New Transcentury Foundation, was conducted from September 1975 to February 1976 by
two teams, each comprised of four immigration inspectors. One team inspected a
random sample of entrants at ten major international airports in the United
States, and the other team inspected a random sample of entrants at the twelve
busiest ports of entry on the Mexican border. Both teams used routine inspection
techniques and questions. However, since both teams were relieved of the usual
hectic inspection pressures they were able to make more thorough inspections.
Because the number of mala fide applicants for admission was estimated to be
relatively small compared with the many millions of annual entries, a sample of
some 240,000 persons was determined to be a statistically valid sample.
During the course of the study, the two close-inspection teams denied entry to
between twelve and fourteen times the number of applicants denied entry under
routine inspection procedures. There were 709 mala fide applicants identified by
the land team for 203,658 admissions, a ratio of 1 to 287, and 185 mala fide applicants at airports for 38,808 admissions, a ratio of 1 to 210.
28. Telephone interview with Lisa Roney, Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS (Oct. 13, 1981).
According to Roney, who helped plan and direct the study, Canadian land border ports were excluded
because Canadian citizens are not required to have border-crossing documents and because relatively few
illegal aliens enter the United States there compared with the Mexican border, and because there was a
plan, not carried out, to do a supplementary survey of that border. Sea ports were not surveyed because
they represented only an estimated 1% of fraudulent entries.
29. See OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION, IMMIGRATION AND NATURLIZATION SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ILLEGAL ALIEN STUDY, PART 1: FRAUDULENT ENTRANT STUDY, A STUDY OF MALA
FIDE APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION AT SELECTED AIRPORTS AND SOUTHWEST BORDER PORTS (1976).
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The border team found that 55% of its mala fide applicants were women. The
average age of all mala fide applicants detected was twenty-seven to twenty-eight
years, and almost one-quarter of the mala fide entries occurred on Saturdays (suggesting a pattern of going back and forth to jobs in the border states). At the
airports, 55% of mala fide applicants intercepted were men, and the average age
was thirty years. Some 71% of this group came from Caribbean countries. The
majority of this group carried valid nonimmigrant visas, but many intended to
30
seek or return to jobs or to settle with relatives in the United States.
Based on the results of the two teams, in excess of 500,000 mala fide applicants
were projected to have successfully entered through the studied ports during fiscal
1975, roughly 450,000 at land ports, and 50,000 at international airports. One
must carefully note, however, that the foregoing projection represents only mala
fide entries and not necessarily the population of illegal entrants.
2.

Present Validity of the Study

In order to maintain its relevance, the 1975 Fraudulent Entrants Study should
be updated, and based, if possible, on a larger sample for several reasons. 31 First,
the number of aliens and returning U.S. citizens admitted through all American
ports of entry and international airports continues to grow by millions each year,
suggesting an overwhelming workload for immigration and customs inspectors. In
fiscal 1978, for instance, 103,000,000 aliens (many of them repeat visitors) and
60,000,000 U.S. citizens (mostly Mexican-Americans and Anglo-American tourists) were admitted through Mexican border ports. Similarly, over the Canadian
border 51,700,000 aliens were admitted to the United States and 36,000,000 American citizens crossed into Canada. Also admitted in 1978 were some 9,300,000
nonimmigrant aliens from all parts of the world, arriving mostly at international
airports. 32 Immigration inspectors, who currently number less than 1,350, believe
that the percentage of fraudulent and mala fide entrants through ports of entry
has steadily gone up since 1975, and that the number entering through airports
33
alone may now be at least several hundred thousand a year.
Second, an overwhelming percentage of all apprehensions are Mexican, Latin
American, and other aliens attempting to enter by way of Mexico. The number of
illegal aliens who successfully enter at international airports or through Canadian
ports of entry with fraudulent documents or with mala fide intentions, if known,
would undoubtedly change the proportions of the table.
30. Id. at viii-ix.
31. According to David S. North, Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New Transcentury Foundation, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 6, 1981) (telephone memo); see also Keely, supra note 18, at 475.
32. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 42, 58 (1978); see also Chicago Trib., supra note 10.
33. Interviews with immigration officers in 24 district offices and substations, and with border
patrolmen in seven sectors during twelve-week tour of midwestern and southwestern states (Mar. I to Apr.
10, and May 1 to June 15, 1981); see also Telephone interview with Michael G. Harpold, President, Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, American Federation of Government Employees (Oct. 2,
1981).
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Third, "Entries Without Inspections" (EWI's) can be a very misleading figure.
Many illegals pass through ports of inspection with documents, but once in the
United States they often hide the entry document and take an assumed name,
because if they were apprehended with the document they could be subject to
felony charges 34 and, in any case, the entry document would be confiscated. Consequently, when fraudulent entrants are picked up, they commonly reply that they
crossed the border avoiding inspection ports. They are then usually given a
nonpenalty voluntary departure, and soon after can use the same hidden document to return through an entry port where inspection is minimal because of manpower shortages in the INS. Those shortages can be seen in appendices B and C.
The distribution of apprehended aliens for a recent year is given in the table
below, which also roughly indicates the countries from which illegal aliens most
commonly come, but not necessarily the real proportions.
C.

The Reyes Residential Survey of Illegal Aliens

By 1976 the subject of "how many illegal aliens?" was enveloped in a fog of
conflicting estimates and interpretations. Many federal legislators and top immigration officials believed it was high time for a headcount of illegal residents. If
such a count could be taken, its results might cut through an impasse and prepare
the way for enlightened legislative or enforcement measures.
Consultant David S. North proposed a residential survey and indicated how it
might be done. Commissioner Chapman saw this proposal as a logical culmination of illegal alien research studies fostered by his administration, and therefore
pushed the idea before the interagency Domestic Council on Illegal Aliens, a
group appointed by the Ford administration. 35 By then, proposals of mass
amnesty were floating in the air.36 The Council agreed that before endorsing such
a radical solution more precise information about the number and nature of the
possible beneficiaries would be needed. The Council therefore approved the
survey on the understanding that it could be completed in one year. 3 7 Congress
agreed, and in fiscal 1976 gave the INS $1,000,000 to cover contract costs. Never
before had the INS had such a windfall to invest in immigration study.
The objectives of the residential survey were: (1) to estimate the number of
illegal aliens by type (for example, entrant without inspection, visa abuser, mala
fide applicant, or falsely documented) in selected areas in the twelve most populous states where, it was assumed, the majority of illegals would be found, namely:
California, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Florida; (2) to collect and analyze information
34.
35.
36.

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1325 (Supp. IV 1980).
Telephone interview with Lisa Roney, Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS (Nov. 14, 1981).
See S. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), CONG. REC. S2454; U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMM. ON

ILLEGAL ALIENS [EXECUTIVE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT], PRELIMINARY REPORT DOMESTIC COUNCIL

COMM. ON ILLEGAL ALIENS DECEMBER 1976, at 242-43 (1976).

37. U.S. Comptroller General (GAO), Review of the Contract of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service with J.A. Associates, Inc. (1978) (prepared for Joshua Eilberg, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Comptroller General].
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on the characteristics of illegal aliens, such as age, sex, nationality, education,
mode of entry, length of stay, type of job, source of livelihood, size of family; (3) to
determine the extent to which illegal residents made use of social services; and (4)
to suggest further lines of research. 38 The rationale for sampling immigrant communities in twelve populous states was based on a "clustering hypothesis" which
assumes that illegal aliens naturally tend to live in neighborhoods where there is
39
already a concentration of legal aliens of the same or similar ethnic origin.
After hasty competitive bidding, the contract was awarded to J.A. Reyes Associates, a Mexican-American research firm based in Washington, D.C. Emphasizing that illegal aliens would rather run than be counted, Joseph Reyes
convinced immigration officials that his mostly Hispanic group understood the
people in question (presumably mostly Mexicans and other Hispanics) and thus
could gain their confidence. As a condition of success, however, he insisted that
4°
the INS suspend all area control operations in the neighborhoods under study.
Reyes Associates, counting on technical assistance from the INS and other government agencies, and on neighborhood cooperation from parish priests and other
social outreach agencies such as the community development agencies set up by
the War on Poverty, proposed to send teams of trained researchers through immigrant colonies. Their goal sounded somewhat like "the impossible dream," said an
immigration employee, for they were to gather 100,000 interviews in twelve
months from legal and illegal residents alike, 10,000 in phase I, the test phase, and
the remainder in phase II.
The Reyes contract initially amounted to $75 1,000. Later, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare added $80,000 for research on the use of social
service programs by illegal aliens. Another $147,000 was spent on a separate contract for management and technical assistance. No additional funding was available from other government departments, in part because the Reyes design seemed
41
too ambitious.
In the fall of 1977, a preliminary test of approximately 700 interviews was conducted in order to refine interviewer training and procedures and adjust the questionnaires. But already the project had fallen behind schedule. Meanwhile, soon
after the Carter administration came to power in January 1977, Commissioner
Chapman was replaced by Leonel F. Castillo. In February, after several extensions of time, the contractor explained to Commissioner Castillo that the survey
could not be completed with the $300,000 that remained.
Congressional committees faced with the Carter plan of mass amnesty for
illegal aliens began to fret. Where was Reyes? Where was the data? Congressman
Sam B. Hall of the House Subcommittee on Immigration told Castillo at the
38. Id
39. Id at 2-3; Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Residential Survey:
Conduct a Residential Survey to Estimate the Illegal Alien Population in the Twelve Most Populous States
and to Obtain and Analyze Characteristics and Impact Data (Aug. 2, 1976) (memorandum).
40. Telephone interview with Ralph Thomas, Consultant to U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (Oct. 6, 1981).
41. Report of the Comptroller General, supra note 37, at 2; Telephone Interview with Robert
Anderson, Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS (Nov. 13, 1981).
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March 1978 hearings: "I think I can see that he's going to come in and ask for
additional funds."
"He already has," said Mr. Castillo. The figure under discussion was another
$1,000,000.42

Commissioner Castillo ordered the survey reduced to 10,000 interviews and
extended the delivery date to October 9, 1978, allowing a total of twenty-five
months. Finally, in June 1978, regular interviews got underway, but a month later
the money ran out. Reyes wanted $130,000 to complete at least a large sampling.
Castillo told a reporter: "I decided that these cost overruns have a way of just
running out of sight. So I felt it was simply time to cut bait and take what we
had."'4 3 As it turned out, Mr. Castillo had no fish. Reyes, aggrieved, refused to
hand over the incomplete data. According to a reporter, he refused to discuss a
court action that would force him to turn over the data and turn back some of the
money. "Anything I've got to say would be twisted around to make me look like a
44
jerk."
What went wrong? The Government Accounting Office which investigates
how public money is spent or misspent, usually after the fact, found that the original size, methodology, and timeframe of the Reyes Project were faulty, and that
additional, awkward delays were caused by the inexperience of all groups
involved. For example, a several month delay occurred while the INS tried to
recruit cooperation from other government agencies. In addition, there was the
surprising timidity of INS legal counsel who, after the contract had been signed,
found themselves uncertain whether under the Privacy Act of 1974 information
gathered from annual alien address reports could be used to identify areas for the
Reyes study where legal and illegal aliens might cluster. 45 Furthermore, INS personnel new to this type of research pestered Reyes Associates with requests for
changes in survey design and questionnaire content, and both parties quarreled
over contractual definitions. All the while, the contractor had to pay his inactive
teams.
Presently, Mr. Reyes sits on top of whatever information his associates accumulated. No outsider has ever seen it. His legal stance is as formidable as that of the
U.S. Census Bureau, as shown below in section VIII-C. He holds in trust confidential raw data and client information that conceivably could be abused by public
officials or immigration officers. To say the least, Reyes Associates would want
additional funding, possibly $150,000 or more, to cover the cost of processing the
46
unseen data, and to prepare an interpretative profile and final report.
42. Dickey, 11 Mi//ton US Study Yields Dubius Results, The Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1978, at IA,
col. 5.
43. Id
44. Id
45. Report of the Comptroller General, supra note 37, at 6; Telephone interview with William Joyce,
Office of Planning and Evaluation, INS (Oct. 6, 1981).
46. Immigration and NaturalizationServze: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the Senate Comm. on theJudciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-50 (1979); Interview with Joseph A.
Reyes, Immigration Consultant, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 23, 1981); Telephone interview with Steve
Schroffel, Statistics Division, INS (Oct. 5, 1981).
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IV
ANALYTICAL-RESIDUAL ESTIMATES OF ILLEGAL ALIENS

As the decade of the 1970's progressed and illegal aliens became a growing
public policy concern, demographers, academicians, and statisticians, fascinated
by the riddle of numbers, made some notable efforts to calculate the size of the
illegal alien population using various analytical techniques. A few representative
examples follow.
In 1974, Howard Goldberg, a graduate student at Georgetown University, did
a seminar paper in demography interesting for its use of the "classic techniques" of
the residual method for estimating a migrant population. He compared census
data from Mexico and the United States for the years 1960 and 1970; then using
survival rates and fertility rates for a ten-year period he calculated the expected
population increase of Mexico had there been no out-migration. The actual 1970
Mexican census count was subtracted from the expected census count to reach a
residual estimate of 1,860,000 emigrants during that decade. Then subtracting the
enumerated increase of Mexicans in the United States from 1960 to 1970 (260,000
according to the U.S. Census count), Goldberg reached a rough estimate of
1,600,000 Mexican emigrants who had entered the United States illegally in the
1960's and were still alive in 1970. 4 7 For comparative purposes, the number of
Mexican immigrants legally admitted into the United States during that same
decade was 443,301.48 The Goldberg residual method employed a number of
questionable assumptions, perhaps the most important of which was the assumption that the Mexican census omission rates in 1960 and 1970 remained relatively
49
the same.
In 1979, demographer David M. Heer, in another noteworthy example of the
use of residual techniques, sought to approximate the net annual inflow of deportable Mexican nationals. He examined the increase in the Mexican-origin population in the United States, according to averages taken from the Census Bureau's
annual Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1970 through 1975. Heer
then calculated the natural increase in the Mexican-origin population allowing for
births and deaths over a five-year period, and added the known amount of annual
legal immigration, but allowed also for an assumed return rate to Mexico. In this
way he reached the expected increase in the Mexican-origin population, which
was then subtracted from the annual CPS survey estimates to leave residual estimates. Heer found that from 1970 to 1975, illegal net immigration from Mexico
ranged from 80,000 to 242,000 per year, and this added up to 400,000 to 1,200,000
for the whole five-year periodYm Other demographers raise a number of questions
47. H. Goldberg, Estimates of Emigration from Mexico and Illegal Entry into the United States,
1960-1970, by the Residual Method 2, 5-6, 11, 13-14 (1974) (unpublished paper available from the
Georgetown University Center for Population Research, Washington, D.C.).
48. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 64
(1970).
49. See Siegel, supra note 17, at 19-20; M. GARCiA Y GRIEGO & C. ZAZUETA, APPROACHES TO THE
ESTIMATION OF DEPORTABLE MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: CONJECTURES OR EMPIRICAL MEA-

SUREMENT? 18-20, 26-30, 47-50 (1980) [hereinafter cited as APPROACHES].
50. See Heer, What Is the Annual Net Flow of Undoaumented Mexican lmmjgrants to the United States?, 16
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about Heer's assumptions and methodology, pointing out that the annual CPS
sample surveys "move in an irregular fashion because of sampling and response
errors."51
An innovative attempt to compute the size of the illegal alien population in
certain regions using residual techniques was presented in 1979 by J. Gregory
Robinson, 52 who compared death rates for white males, age twenty to forty, in the
period 1960 to 1975 for five states in the Southwest and five in the Northeast,
where reportedly there were the largest concentrations of illegal residents. One
should note here that for Census purposes, Mexicans and nearly all other immigrants fall into the white population category.
Robinson, a Census Bureau demographer, assumed that relatively few illegals
showed up in Census counts of 1960 or 1970, or in the CPS of 1975, but that death
statistics included most illegal residents in the ten-state area, and, moreover, that
their death rates were similar to the general population. He reasoned that regions
having a heavy concentration of illegal residents would naturally have death rates
exceeding those of the general population. Indeed, his analysis of the data did
show such higher rates; it also suggested that for 1975, the illegal population of
white males, age twenty to forty-four, could range anywhere from 600,000 to
4,700,000.

53

Some of Robinson's assumptions have been found to be shaky by a subsequent
Census Bureau study. 54 Also, the observation has been made that Robinson was
actually trying to measure a proportion of the total population missed by the
Census. But that proportion could conceivably include, besides deportable aliens,
55
other groups, such as visitors or Puerto Ricans, commonly missed by the Census.
In any case, Robinson's range of estimates, like those of Heer, seem so wide that
they would be of little practical use in public policy decisions about immigration.
In 1978, Clarise Lancaster and Frederick Scheuren of the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA), using a sophisticated "multiple systems approach" and a
combination of empirical and analytical techniques, estimated the total number of
all illegal residents in the United States in 1973. They matched relatively small
samples of IRS individual income tax returns, Social Security contributions, and
beneficiary data for age groups eighteen to forty-four, with the CPS of March
1973. Assuming that IRS and SSA data included resident aliens, the authors compared that data with the CPS estimate which they assumed did not include an
appreciable number of illegal residents. The difference amounts to an estimated
stock population of 3,900,000 illegal residents aged eighteen to forty-four but with
417 (1979). This is a condensed version of a paper prepared by Heer, a demographer associated with the Population Research Laboratory, University of Southern California, for the Employment
and Training Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor.
51. Siegel, supra note 17, at 22-24.
52. See Robinson, Estimating the Size of the Illegal Alien Population in the United States by the Comparative
Trend Analysis of Age-Specifw Death Rates, 17 DEMOGRAPHY 159, 159-76 (1980).
53. Id. at 160-61, 163, 168-72.
54. Siegel, supra note 17, at 22-23.
55. APPROACHES, supra note 49, at 18-19.
DEMOGRAPHY
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a possible low of 2,900,000 and a possible high of 5,700,000.56
This study has been faulted on a number of points. For example, employment
data for many illegal aliens paid in cash are lacking. Also, it is possible that many
deportable aliens do, indeed, file income tax returns, and that many have SSA
payments automatically deducted from paychecks, yet many of these could be
Mexican and other seasonal workers who reside in the home country in the off57
season.
Nevertheless, the range of estimates offered by Lancaster and Scheuren seem
quite plausible to immigration experts. Moreover, the "multiple systems
approach" represents the first serious attempt by employees of a federal agency to
apply a record-keeping methodology to the numbers game. Unfortunately, federal
agencies have so far made little use of such techniques in estimating the number of
illegal alien residents in the United States.
In the fall of 1981, Census Bureau demographer Robert Warren used two analytic methods to yield similar residual estimates of illegal aliens who entered in the
period July 1970 to November 1979. In one study, Warren used estimates of the
foreign-born population that entered the United States legally in that period based
on INS data on legal immigrants, refugees, and foreign students, with allowances
being made for emigration and mortality. The resulting figure of 3,474,000 was
then subtracted from the November 1979 CPS estimate of 4,612,000 for the foreign-born population that entered in the period, leaving a difference of 1,138,000.
This latter figure would represent counted illegal aliens who entered in that same
period, as. shown in table 8.
Warren's other residual technique used data on the number of aliens registering with the INS in January 1980 with an estimate of the completeness of the
registration on form 1-53, which reports an entry date. The resulting estimate of
2,970,000 registered aliens was then compared, with adjustments, to the November
1979 CPS estimate of 4,222,000. The difference of 1,252,000 is assumed to represent illegal aliens from all countries who entered the United States in the period
1970-1979 and who were counted by the CPS. The same techniques indicated
that 734,000 of the counted illegal aliens came from Mexico, 240,000 in the period
1970 to 1974, and 494,000 in the period 1975 to 1979. Although one must allow
for legals and illegals moving seasonally back and forth over the Mexican border,
Warren's data seem to confirm a growing trend in illegal immigration.5 8
A study by University of Texas demographers, Frank D. Bean, Allan G. King,
and others, with the special assistance of Jeffrey S. Passel of the U.S. Census
56. Lancaster & Scheuren, Counting the Uncountable Illegals: Some Initial StatistiralSpeculation Employing
Capture-Recapture Techniques, 1977 PROC. OF THE SOC. STAT. SEC., PART I 530-35 (1978) (proceedings of
American Statistical Association. The authors were then with the Social Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.).
57. APPROACHES, supra note 49, at 14-16; see also Sehgal & Vialet, Documenting the Undocumented- Data,
Like Aliens, Are Elusive, U.S. DEP'T LAB. MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1980, at 18, 18-21.
58. R. Warren, Estimates of the Size of the Illegal Alien Population in the United States Table 3
(Nov. 12-13, 1981) (an unpublished paper presented to the Census Advisory Committee Meeting of the
American Statistical Association in Washington, D.C.).
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8

CENSUS ESTIMATES OF THE ILLEGAL FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION
THAT ENTERED THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN
NOVEMBER,
(1)

4,089,000

(2)

140,000

(3)

61,000

(4)

694,000

(5)

3,484,000

(6)

4,612,000

(7)

1,138,000

Source:

1970

AND

1979

Immigrants and refugees
(INS Annual Reports, 1970-1979, and unpublished data for
refugees)
Nonimmigrant foreign students
(INS Alien Registration data, January 1979)
Deaths
(Estimates from U.S. life tables)
Emigration of 1970-1979 immigrants
(Assumes 1960-1970 Cohort emigration rate,
Feb. 1980, at 77)

DEMOGRAPHY,

Estimates of foreign-born population
(Controlled to January 1980 totals, adjusted by 9.2% for
underreporting)
November 1979 Current Population Survey, CPS
(Adjusted to be consistent with corrected independent controls
and for overreporting of naturalization of foreign born
population)
Difference between (5) and (6)
(Presumably census-counted illegal aliens who entered 19701979)

R. Warren, Estimates of the Size of the Illegal Alien Population in the United States 9
(Nov. 12-13, 1981) (adapted from Table 2) (presented to the Census Advisory Committee Meeting of the American Statistical Association, Bureau of the Census).

Bureau, is apparently the first serious attempt to estimate by analytical methods
the size of the "undocumented" population for a given state. The study came in
response to a request by Governor William P. Clements, Jr., and other state officials for estimates of illegal Mexican migrants in Texas in order to support arguments before the Supreme Court that untold numbers of undocumented migrant
children should not be entitled to a free public education at local expense. 59 Also,
deeply concerned about sweeping amnesty proposals in Congress, Texas officials
wanted more information about the possible size of the undocumented Mexican
population.
Primary sources used by the authors were 1970 and 1980 census information on
the Spanish surname population of Texas, residential information on persons of
Mexican foreign stock, and annual alien registration data for legal Mexican immigrants, together with data on the characteristics of apprehended persons and on
Mexican immigrants whose intended state of residence was Texas. Significantly,
an alternative set of estimates was derived from Mexican census information for
1970 and 1980; and from Mexico's CENIET residential surveys, discussed in section VII-C.
59.

Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
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The use of Mexican census data involved an analysis of sex ratios for the 1970
and 1980 enumerations and cohort survival ratios for age groups, particularly the
age group fifteen to thirty-nine years. This methodology rests on the premise
that-in Texas at least-the migrant flux over a porous border is mainly a phenomenon associated with young males and that Mexican census data should there60
fore show a relative absence of males.
Using a sophisticated combination of analytical-residual techniques that,
among other things, compared the expected growth of the Mexican-origin population in Texas with the reported growth during a decennial period, the authors
reached a range of estimates for the undocumented Mexican migrant population
in 1980. The extremes ran from 568,100 to 918,000, with an average midpoint of
763,800.61 The average figure might easily be too low, not only because of census
undercounts, but because of the fraudulent use of "Tex-Mex" birth certificates for
several generations.
In a follow-up study, also directed toward the Governor's Task Force on Illegal
Aliens, Bean and King attempted to gauge the size of the undocumented Mexican
population on a national scale. Making the same assumptions and using similar
sources and methodology, including the lower proportion of males in Mexican
census data for 1970 and 1980, the authors concluded that the number of illegal
Mexican migrants in the United States in 1980 ranged from 1,800,000 to
4,200,000, with an average estimate of 2,900,000.62
With respect to the carefully calculated estimates of Bean and King, a Mexican
observer might note that one problem with the sex-based ratios as found in Mexican census data is that the lower proportion of males may be due as much to the
migration of rural unemployed men and boys to Mexican cities as to their migration to the United States. Mexican cities swarm with transient males, and it is
probable that the Mexican census seriously undercounts this vagrant population.
Moreover, estimates based on sex-based ratios do not seem to take fully into
account the fact that family members usually follow an undocumented worker
who decides to settle in the United States, and that he or she usually does not
reveal family facts. What is clear is that uncounted family members, in cumula63
tive fashion, are generating a growing concern about social costs.
In general, the analytical-residual techniques used by Goldberg, Heer,
Robinson, Lancaster, Scheuren, Warren, Bean, King, Passel, and others have
brought a much-needed scientific methodology to the numbers game. They have
also served to discredit exaggerated estimates of deportable populations by emphasizing that the most important measure is not the gross flow but the net flow and
60. F. Bean & A. King, Estimates of the Number of Illegal Migrants in the State of Texas 26-31 (Mar.
15, 1982) (a report prepared, with the assistance of R. Benford, L. Perkins, and others associated with the
Population Research Center of the University of Texas, for the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Aliens,
Governor's Office of Budget and Planning).
61. Id at 36-37.
62. F. Bean & A. King, A Sex Ratio-Based Estimate of the Number of Illegal Migrants of Mexican
Origin in the United States 2, 10, 17 (Summer 1982) (available from The Center for Population Research,
University of Texas at Austin).
63. IMMIGRANTS--AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE
UNITED STATES

291-93 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
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the cumulative stock.64
On the other hand, as the GAO has emphasized to immigration reform leaders
in Congress, no one has yet developed a satisfactory methodology for counting
diverse groups of people who do not want to be counted. So far, the most that the
GAO can propose is "a multi-indicator method" in which it hopes possible errors
65
would counterbalance each other.
V
SPECULATIVE ESTIMATES OF ILLEGAL ALIENS

The subject of "How many illegal aliens?" naturally invites speculative estimates. In their simplest form these are impressionistic guesses. More advanced are
the speculative methodologies or techniques which may employ a combination of
fragmentary data, reasonable assumptions, informed guesses from experienced
people, simple arithmetic, and logic, and which may yield estimates of a "shadow
population" sometimes more in accord with common sense and the observer's eye
than those produced by the more scientific methodologies. Two examples of speculative estimates are the Lesko survey and the immigration district survey which
were described in section III.
Another representative example of speculative estimates is provided by labor
economist Walter F. Fogel at the University of California, Los Angeles, in a study
of Mexican illegal workers published in 1978.66 Fogel started with a 1975 statement made by Commissioner Chapman to the effect that immigration records
failed to account for the departure of 10% of the more than 6,000,000 annual foreign visitors, and that an estimated 5% had actually remained in the United
States. Fogel, who presumably used INS data, apparently assumed that about
30,000,000 nonimmigrant visitors were admitted to the U.S. interior in the period
1965-1974. Chapman's estimate thus could mean that during a ten-year period
1,500,000 nonimmigrants, presumably Mexican nationals, remained illegally in
the United States.

67

Fogel gave a second example of speculative approaches. According to experienced immigration officers and a 1973 California agricultural study, the INS has
only a one-in-five chance of apprehending an illegal entrant who has been in the
country for a month or more. In 1974 about 200,000 illegals, presumably Mexicans, were so reported. One might then assume that another 800,000 went undetected. Allowing "rather arbitrarily" that half of this number return voluntarily to
Mexico, the net addition would be 400,000 for 1974. Using INS apprehension
data, Fogel estimated that possibly 4,000,000 Mexicans entered illegally in the
years 1965 to 1974. If half returned voluntarily this would leave a cumulative
stock figure of 2,000,000 for that period. If one added 200,000 for the current 1974
net flow, and 1,500,000 nonimmigrants, the illegal alien population, presumably
Heer, supra note 50.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROBLEMS
ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION i-iii, 19-23 (1982).
66. W. FOGEL, supra note 12, at 23-25.
67. Id
64.
65.

AND OPTIONS IN ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF THE
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Mexican, at the end of a ten-year period becomes 3,700,000.68 Fogel's main point
in this little exercise was to show how simple it is to make speculative estimates
with any available figure and some convenient assumptions. The limitations of
such speculative techniques have been discussed at length by demographers
69
Manuel Garcia y Griego and Carlos H. Zazueta.
In a more complex example of speculative techniques, Edwin P. Reubens, an
economist, at the City College of New York, sought to measure the net annual
inflow of illegal workers. 70 He started with an annual apprehension figure of
1,000,000 a year (as in fiscal 1977, 1978, and 1979, according to INS figures) and
used assumptions about "got-away" ratios and return rates of deportable aliens
obtained from experienced immigration agents in five immigration districts facing
the largest inflows of illegals.
Discounting "repeaters," Reubens estimated that 600,000 individual illegals
were apprehended in a year such as 1979. This latter figure was then doubled to
represent the estimated number of illegals who successfully avoided apprehension.
Another informed assumption was that most of the 1,200,000 illegal entrants were
young, able-bodied adults, and, therefore, it was estimated that 80% or 960,000,
participated in the American labor market. From the latter figure, 40% was
deducted to account for short stays and voluntary returns, leaving 600,000 as the
net annual inflow of all illegal foreign workers in 1979. Of the aforementioned
71
number, 450,000 or 75% were estimated to be Mexicans.
In a matter of related interest, Professor Reubens estimated the cumulative
stock of foreign workers, legal and illegal, for the eight years 1972-1979. For legal
permanent alien workers, an annual figure of 180,000 net inflow was used; the
accumulation came to 1,440,000. This inflow figure was based on INS admissions
of legal resident aliens at approximately 400,000 per year, with a 60% labor-participation rate 72 and further reduced by a 25% return rate (based on intercensal
data), yielding an annual figure of 180,000.
For refugees, who were relatively few from 1973 to 1979, an accumulation of
120,000 workers was adopted. The temporary foreign workers, mostly admitted as
seasonal workers, were treated as revolving stock, and thus contributed 100,000
workers. "Finally, for the illegals-whose numbers have been rising strongly
during the 1970's, so far as the entry trend may be measured by the reported
apprehensions-we adopt an average of 480,000 annual net inflow, and multiply
by eight years, to yield an accumulation of 3,840,000 illegal workers."' 73 The sum
68.
69.
70.

Id

APPROACHES, supra note 49, at 47-50.
See Reubens, Immzgration Problems, Limited-Visa Programs and Other Options, in U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: APPENDIX F TO STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 89, 91-139 (1980) (Supplement to SCIRP FINAL REPORT) [hereinafter cited as Appendix F to SCIRP FINAL REPORT]; Aliens, Jobs and Immigration Policy, PUB. INTEREST,
Spring 1978, at 113, 116-17.
71. See Reubens, supra note 70; Aliens, Jobs and Immigration Pol, supra note 70.
72. Rate derived from U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMM. ON ILLEGAL ALIENS [EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT], supra note 36.
73. Appendix E to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 133-34.
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of all the foregoing classes amounted to a net accumulated stock of 5,500,000 foreign workers during the period 1972-1979.
Such estimates in the aggregate seem realistic to experienced immigration
officers and more acceptable than the results from most analytic-residual studies,
but since the methodology depends here and there on "educated guesswork," it
would be naturally difficult to prove or disprove the accuracy of Reubens' figures.
Also, it is possible that he may have overestimated somewhat the net annual inflow
of Mexican illegal workers by not adjusting enough for INS concentration of
enforcement efforts in the states bordering on Mexico (90% of the Border Patrol is
there) resulting in high apprehension rates for Mexican aliens, including
"repeaters," and low arrest rates for other nationalities.7 4
In fact, during the past several years about 87% to 90% of all INS apprehensions have been Mexican nationals. 75 (Annual apprehension figures are included
in appendix A.) However, experienced immigration employees believe that perhaps 40% to 50% of the present net inflow of illegal alien workers and family members are non-Mexican, mostly arriving as superficially inspected tourists and
visitors at international airports. 76 Here, two complementary factors are U.S. consulates overseas that hurriedly issue visas and the shortage of trained immigration
inspectors at ports of entry. (Shortages of immigration and consular personnel are
reflected in appendices B and C.)
What has been said about Reubens' flow estimates could partially apply to
those of Milton D. Morris and Albert Mayio, who estimated the undocumented
77
flow from Mexico for the year 1978 as running between 1,075,000 and 1,735,000.
This rough approximation, which assumes a heavy return flow of seasonal workers,
was derived from INS apprehension data, questionable INS estimates of "gotaway" ratios, and the percentage of fraudulent entrants based on the INS 1976
study, and CENIET flow information as shown in section VII-C.
Also, Morris and Mayio used flow estimates from Lesko Associates to estimate
the stock of illegal immigrant populations. After assuming a base figure of about
1,000,000 illegal Mexican residents in the United States in 1970, they then added
the estimated net flow over the ensuing eight years to reach an estimated illegal
Mexican population of 2,400,000 in 1977. By similar speculative methods the
authors estimated the total illegal alien population to run from 4,300,000 to
6,200,000.78
In the fall of 1978 President Carter appointed the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) under the chairmanship of Father Theodore
Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University. 79 In 1980 SCIRP, influenced by
APPROACHES, supra note 49, at 47-50.
75. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT Table
30 (1970); see also id at app. A.
76. Television interview of Kenneth T. Blaylock, American Federation of Government Employees, on
NBC Meet the Press (Sept. 6, 1981).
77. M. Morris & A. Mayio, Foreign Policy Aspects of Illegal Immigration A-3-7 to A-3-11 (1980)
(prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Labor).
78. Id at 3-57 to 3-60.
79. The sixteen-member commission, which included distinguished congressmen, senators, cabinet
74.

Page 223: Spring 1982]

THE NUMBERS GAME

the Reyes fiasco, requested Census Bureau demographers (but not the Census
Bureau per se) to give their best estimate of the number of illegal resident aliens in
the United States."" This speculative study, authored by Jacob S. Siegel, Jeffrey
S. Passel, and J. Gregory Robinson, was entitled Preh'minagy Review ofExisting Studies
of the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States."' The authors did no empirical
research of their own, but rather a careful evaluation and critique of selected
studies conducted during the 1970's that had made a significant or plausible effort
to measure the size of the illegal alien population or the net inflow, as seen in
appendix D.
In conclusion, the three demographers offered the following as "cautious
speculations":

8 2

The total number of illegal residents in the United States for some recent year, such as
1978, is almost certainly below 6.0 million, and may be substantially less, possibly only 3.5
to 5.0 million ....
The Mexican component of the illegally resident population is almost certainly less than
3.0 million, and may be substantially less, possibly only 1.5 to 2.5 million.

No estimate was made of the percentage of illegals that might have been in the
U.S. labor force.
Having nothing more substantial to go on, most members of SCIRP accepted
the foregoing estimates as a working hypothesis, but they had no clear sense of
proportion between family dependents and workers.8 3 Consequently, such estimates, considered conservative by some immigration experts, helped shape some of
the rather generous recommendations of SCIRP submitted to the President and
members, and persons representing ethnic minority and labor interests, was under the executive direction
of Dr. Lawrence Fuchs of Brandeis University.
SCIRP, at work from October 1978 to March 1981, was mainly concerned with gathering testimony
and policy recommendations with respect to: (1) the socioeconomic impact of immigrants, legal and
illegal, and refugees; and (2) reform needs in immigration and refugee policies. This was mainly accomplished through twelve regional meetings held in such cities as New York, Chicago, Miami, Denver, Los
Angeles, and San Antonio, and through invitations to specialists in immigration and immigrant labor to
present an account of their research findings, their interpretations and their policy recommendations to
SCIRP, the Carter Administration's standing Interagency Task Force on Immigration, the Department of
Labor, or congressional hearings.
Among social scientists and professional researchers who contributed, one way or another, to the
SCIRP, and whose research is relevant to the study of illegal immigration and "cheap labor," were the
following: economists Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Philip Martin, Barry Chiswick, Julian Simon, Edwin P.
Reubens, and Sidney Weintraub; political scientist Wayne Cornelius; researchers David S. North and Guillermina Jasso; and demographers Leon F. Bouvier, Michael Teitelbaum, and Charles Keely.
80. The Select Commission was expected to carry out the most thorough study ever made of national
immigration policy and the impact of immigration on American society and economy. It started out with
some hope that the Reyes survey might still produce some acceptable results, but strangely, SCIRP did not
insist on residential survey information about illegal aliens. See, supra text accompanying notes 35-46. A
consideration here was that government agencies and commissions, feeling burned by the "Residential
Survey," hardly dared to recommend spending money on another residential survey attempt. Consequently, SCIRP settled for a "speculative estimate" of the illegal alien population.
81. Reprinted in Appendix E to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-39.
82. Id. at 33.
83. See Final Report of the Select Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the SenateJudiciary Comm. and Subcomm. on Immiration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciiar, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-52 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearings].
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Congress on March 1, 1981.84
In any case, conjectural estimates of illegals tend to run much higher than the
3,500,000 to 6,000,000 figure currently used by the Reagan administration and
various legislators in formulating immigration reforms. The example below in
table 9 of a higher conjectural estimate, based on some recent research by the
author, might at least serve to suggest the need to break down a rather vague
global estimate of illegal aliens into certain component parts.
TABLE 9
CONJECTURAL ESTIMATES OF ILLEGAL ALIENS SETTLED IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 198185
LOW

HIGH

5,400,000

6,790,000

MEXICAN. Mostly unskilled and semi-skilled workers, male
and female, who, because of border proximity, have on the
average possibly 60% to 70% family dependents in the
household, including many U.S. born children.
Rough breakdown: California, 2.5-3.0 million; Texas 2.0-2.5
million; Illinois, 250,000-350,000; Colorado, 150,000-200,000;
Arizona, 90,000-100,000; New Mexico, 60,000-90,000; other
states, 400,000-500,000.

400,000

530,000

CARIBBEAN. Mainly unskilled workers and family dependents
who commonly live near black and Puerto Rican populations,
as in New York City, Newark, Miami, and Washington, D.C.
Also includes many middle- and upper-class expatriate families,
many with professional training.
Rough breakdown: Dominicans, 140,000 to 180,000; Haitians,
150,000-200,000; Jamaicans, 80,000-100,000; plus 30,000-50,000
Trinidadians, Tobagans, Barbadians, and others, some of them
in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

390,000

500,000

CENTRAL AMERICAN. Mostly in Hispanic areas of Los
Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Miami, Houston,
and Washington, D.C., employed as common labor and
domestics. But includes many student overstays, and tens of
thousands of quasi-political and "economic" refugees from all
social classes, mainly Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, of the latter
several thousand have been granted asylum.
Rough breadown: tSalvadorans, 200,000-230,000; Guatemalans,
70,000-110,000; Panamanians, 60,000-70,000; Nicaraguans,
40,000-50,000; other, 20,000-30,000.

t
84.

Early 1982 estimates of undocumented Salvardoran "refugees" run as high as 400,000.
SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.

85. Information for the estimates was derived from the following sources: (1) Rough estimates and
conjectures from district immigration officers, police officials, educators, and Hispanic and other ethnic
leaders, gathered during tour by author of 24 district immigration offices and substations and seven border
patrol sectors in midwestern and southwestern states, March 1 to April 10, 1981, and May I to June 15,
1981, and Washington, D.C., June 18 to June 23, 1981; (2) Newspaper articles on 1980 Census topics and
alleged undercounts in such cities as New York, Detroit, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco; (3) Various
studies and congressional hearings on illegal aliens; (4) Mexican press coverage, principally from Excelsior,
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SOUTH AMERICAN. Mostly in metropolitan cities like New
York, Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Includes a mix of overstay
students and visitors, professionals, expatriates, drug traffickers,
as from Colombia, and common laborers.
Rough breakdown: Colombians, 100,000-120,000, Argentinians,
40,000-60,000, Ecuadorans, 30,000-50,000; Peruvians, 20,00030,000; other, 80,000-100,000.

440,000

540,000

ASIAN. Principally in "China towns," as in Los Angeles, San
Francisco Bay area, or New York City. Includes many overstay
students and trainees, as well as numerous relatives who labor
in small family-run shops and restaurants or in nearby garment
"sweat shops."
Rough breakdown: Chinese-Taiwanese, 300,000-350,000;
Koreans, 40,000-60,000; Southeast Asians, 80,000-100,000;
Japanese, 20,000-30,000.

250,000

300,000

FILIPINO. Mainly in California and Hawaii as unskilled and
semiskilled labor, but also includes many overstay students,.
visitors, trainee professionals, relatives, and expatriates of all social
classes.

Mexico City, on Mexican groups in the United States; (5) Telephone calls to consular personnel and to
immigrant-aid societies.
Of the illegal aliens currently settled in the United States, possibly 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 would be
employed full-line, year-round. Many help produce and distribute agricultural and industrial goods, and
many perform essential services, as in hospitals and nursing homes. But according to immigration officers,
most illegals seem to perform work of marginal economic value, as in taxi-driving, domestic service, car
washes, hotels, restaurants, laundries, janitorial service, or in the secondary labor market as assembly-line
workers or garment workers. Teenagers or machines could do much of the foregoing labor, or it could be
done in satellite plants in Hong Kong, or in Mexico's border industrial zone.
In addition, a growing number of illegals are employed part-time or full-time in mini-retail businesses,
such as ethnocentric shops and food services run by immigrant friends or relatives within rapidly growing
immigrant colonies. Here also recently arrived women and teenagers are often employed as domestic
servants for other immigrants. The INS, laboring under manpower and court restrictions, has virtually no
control over employment patterns in immigrant colonies.
In estimating the total size of the illegal work force one should allow for part-time workers. Also, one
should add perennial seasonal workers, particularly Mexican transborder migrants who may number
anywhere from 400,000 to 1,000,000, depending on the season. Furthermore, an estimated 250,000 to
300,000 Mexico border-town dwellers cross almost daily as shoppers and visitors to work illegally in
American border communities primarily in low-paying service jobs.
If the latter two Mexican-origin groups were counted as part of the illegal alien population in the
United States in a given season the total conjectural estimate would run in a higher range, from 8,600,000
to 11,000,000. Not included in that range are a large number of older illegal immigrants and overstay
visitors, mostly from Western Europe and Canada, who have become integrated in the mainstream of
American society, but who never bothered to legalize their status, even though they may have raised a
family in the United States.
From the viewpoint of subcultural and exploitation problems, the resident illegal alien population,
perhaps 40% to 50% of it counted in the 1980 census, consists overwhelmingly of Third World immigrants
who have settled in the United States since 1960, mainly in introverted subcultures, where, according to
immigration officers, there is relatively little interest in naturalization. In Third World cultures there is a
strongly felt obligation to bring in members of the extended family, with or without visas, so that the
number of dependents grows. Although many Third World illegals are single, or have not yet brought in
family members, the ratio of family dependents to each full-time worker, male or female, is probably near
two to one on the average, and in Mexican households probably three to one, and higher near the border.
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320,000

350,000

MIDDLE EASTERN AND EAST INDIAN. Many are
overstay students, professionals, political exiles-relatives, with
some common labor recruits, from such countries as Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, India, and Pakistan.

500,000

600,000

OTHER. Includes overstay students, professionals, businessmen,
tourists, and relatives, maybe half from Canada, and most of
the remainder from the British Isles and Europe, notably
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Slavic countries, where kinship
obligations are strong, together with some Africans, former
students mostly.

7,970,000

9,990,000

TOTAL

VI
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES OF ILLEGAL ALIENS

Congressional hearings on immigration bills starting in the early 1970's
revealed, among other things, a woeful lack of firm economic and social data
about illegal aliens. How many are in the American labor force and in what sectors? What immigrant nationalities are found in this or that sector? Do they displace American workers? What percentage of illegal workers receive
unemployment compensation or social security benefits? How many use social
assistance and health programs? How many have taxes deducted from paychecks?
A.

INS Profile Data

The INS, during the term of Commissioner Chapman in 1973-1976, for the
first time made a methodical effort to gather and provide data on patterns of
illegal alien employment and wage levels. Table 10 is an example.
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF EMPLOYED ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
WESTERN REGION By CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT AND BY
WAGE SCALE RANGES FISCAL YEAR

1976

Category

$6.50
Plus

$4.50
6.49

$2.50
4.49

Less Than
$2.49

Heavy Industry
Light Industry
Agriculture
Construction
Services

333
1,167
500
583
583

500
4,585
7,002
583
1,167

1,167
97,189
643,482
3,084
13,670

333
104,607
109,213
2,251
24,672

2,333
207,548
850,197
6,501
40,092

3,166

13,837

758,592

331,076

1,106,671

TOTALS
Source:

Total

Robert J. Seitz, Public Information Director, INS, cited in M.

VILLALPONDO, A STUDY
OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE CouNTY OF SAN DIEGO

48, Table 6 (1977) (citing RoberJ. Seitz, Public Information Director) (copies available
from county).
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Under Commissioner Chapman the INS also provided speculative estimates on
the number of illegal workers by regions. The following table, prepared mostly by
investigative staffs in the district offices, is an example.
Since the departure of Chapman early in 1977, the INS has made little effort to
measure or estimate either the size or the socioeconomic impact of illegal alien
groups. Having committed itself to a human rights policy for disadvantaged
people everywhere, and having appointed Mexican-American Leonel Castillo as
Commissioner of Immigration, the Carter administration was hypersensitive to
complaints by Hispanic leaders, civil libertarians, and affirmative action
employees that immigration data and speculative estimates on alien jobholders
were being used to "scapegoat" Hispanic minorities and to hustle the American
Government into taking deportation measures against the "undocumented
worker" class.8 6 However, the INS did continue to provide Congress with appreTABLE 1 1
ESTIMATED TOTALS OF ALL EMPLOYED ILLEGAL ALIENS BY
IMMIGRATION REGIONS AND DISTRICTS, FISCAL
Eastern Region
New York
Newark
Washington
Other
Subtotal
Western Region
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Phoenix
Honolulu
Subtotal
Southern Region
Houston (inc. Dallas)
Miami
San Antonio
Atlanta
El Paso
New Orleans

1976

840,000
200,000
25,000
113,200

-

-

850,000
210,000
35,000
124,300

1,178,200

-

1,219,300

900,000
150,000
30,000
1,000

-

-

1,000,000
160,000
35,000
1,500

1,081,000

-

1,196,000

440,000
240,000
220,000
60,000
45,000
10,000

-

450,000
250,000
230,000
65,000
50,000
11,000

Subtotal

1,015,000-

Northern Region
Chicago
Detroit
Cleveland
Denver
Portland, Ore.
Other

270,000
40,000
40,000
20,000
20,000
24,500

Subtotal
Total estimate

-

-

-

1,056,000
-

280,000
45,000
45,000
25,000
25,000
29,600

414,500 - 449,600
3,688,700 - 3,921,700

Source: Immigratin 1976." Hearings on S.3074 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalizationof
the Senateoudiciay Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41 (1976).
86.

Corwin, A Human Rights Dilemma. Carter and "Undocumented" Mexicans, in IMMIGRANTS--AND
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hension data indicating the distribution of illegal workers by industry and comparative wage levels.
B.

The North and Houstoun Study of 1976

In January 1975, in the middle of the recession, the Ford administration set up
a Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens consisting of top officials and
their aides from all major departments of the Federal Government under a coordinating arrangement with the Department of Justice and its Immigration Service.
The Domestic Council task force initiated, through several federal agencies, factgathering studies to determine, if possible, the number of illegals and their real
impact on the job market and the American economy, and the "dollar drain" to
immigrant sending countries. Social costs were also to be investigated because
local officials increasingly were seeking compensation from the Federal Government for health, welfare, and education services rendered to illegal immigrants
87
and their families.
The most important and influential of the studies initiated by the Domestic
Council was that done in 1976 under contract to the Department of, Labor by
David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun.8 8 This study was the first methodical
effort to establish the employment and wage patterns of deportable aliens, and to
get at least some comparative information on non-Mexican illegals. The INS
assisted with the project, in part because it was a logical extension of the study
design sponsored by Commissioner Chapman, discussed above in section III.
In the spring of 1975 at nineteen different sites, including Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Seattle, San Antonio, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, Washington, D.C.,
Newark, and New York City, researchers interviewed 793 illegals, of whom 481
were from Mexico, 237 from other Western Hemisphere countries, and 75 from
Eastern Hemisphere countries. Some of them had not been apprehended.
From this sample a much needed socioeconomic profile of the illegal work force
was obtained. The respondents' average stay in the United States was 2.5 years,
their average age 28.5 years (compared to an American work force average of 35),
and their average education 6.7 years, with Mexicans averaging 4.9 years.
Although some had family dependents already in the host country, 88% of the
Mexican respondents said they were supporting dependents in Mexico, sending
home an average of $129 per month out of an average monthly wage of $424.89
PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 320, 320-22, 325,
335, 339 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
87. See Corwin & Fogel, supra note 24, at 281.
For an example of social-cost studies generated by the Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens,
see U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL (GAO), IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROIMMIGRANTS:

GRAMS: Too LITTLE IS KNOWN (1977).

For an example of fact-finding at the state level, see

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: A CALIFORNIA Focus (1977).

88.

D.

NORTH

LABOR MARKET:

& M.

HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S.

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1976) (prepared for the Employment and Training Admin-

istration, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
89. Id. at 80, Table IV-5.
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Another significant finding was that hourly wages were lower for apprehended
illegals, $2.71 on the average, compared to $3.95 for undetected illegals. Other
hourly wage averages were: Eastern Hemisphere illegals, $4.08; Western Hemisphere illegals, $3.04; and Mexican illegals, $2.33. Average hourly wages in agriculture, where many Mexicans were employed, were $2.01 compared with $2.83
for nonagricultural work. The further from the Mexican border one moved, the
higher the average wages became: $3.18 for the Midwest and Northwest, and
$3.29 for the east coast. At that time minimum wages in the United States ranged
from $2.00 to $2.50. The declared occupation of informants in their home countries is indicated in the table below.
TABLE 12
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ILLEGALS INTERVIEWED

Illegals

% in White-collar
jobs

% in
Crafts

% Working as
Operatives

% in Service and
Laborers

48
34
7

13
15
15

27
27
13

13 (1.3% in agriwork)
24 (13% in agriwork)
63 (50% in agriwork)

E.H.
W.H.
Mexican
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Executive Summary of
D. NORTH & M. HOUSTON, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN

THE U.S. LABOR MARKET (1976), (1976).

Except for operatives, skilled illegals, like many immigrant groups coming from
a village craft economy, tend to lose occupational status on entering an industrialized economy. On the other hand, the least skilled, those from Mexico, exhibit
some upward mobility, especially as operatives in factory work.9°
TABLE

13

ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF MEXICAN ILLEGALS
Mexican Illegals

% in Mexico

% in United States

7
15
13
65

1.5
16.0
24.0
58.0

White-collar workers
Craft workers
Operatives
Service and Laborers
Source:

Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Executive Summary of
D. NORTH & M. HOUSTON, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN
THE U.S. LABOR MARKET (1976).

North and Houstoun concluded from their sample of aliens from both hemispheres
that most "illegals are taking jobs that no Americans want."9 1
C.

Other Important Profile Studies
Other researchers raised similar doubts about the restrictionist concern that
90.
91.

See id.at 80-113, Table V-7; see also U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 87, ch. 5.
D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 88, at 162-63.
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illegal aliens were, all in all, a socioeconomic liability, or that most job slots opened
by removing illegal aliens would be filled by jobless Americans, as Commissioner
Chapman was wont to say. Aside from Bustamante, Cornelius, and the Mexican
side of the research discussed in section VII, researchers on the American side,
including Manuel Villalpando, Michael Piore, Gilbert Cardenas, and Toni
Breiter, rejected the common assumptions that illegal aliens from Mexico and
other Third World countries pay little in taxes, generate high social assistance
costs, displace native workers, adversely affect the nation's balance of payments, or
92
always seek permanent settlement.
In elaboration on such a study of San Diego County, Villalpando and others
pointed out that in 1975-the depths of the recession in Los Angeles-2,154 jobs
were opened by the removing of illegals, but the State Human Resources Development Agency could not fill them. 93 Moreover, when the INS opened 340 jobs in
San Diego County in 1975-1976 under an Employer Cooperation Program, the
jobs could be filled only by greencard commuters from Tijuana. Half of those jobs
were in the hotel-motel business and paid $2.00 per hour and tips. 94 Villalpando
calculated that a welfare family of five could then receive about $4,800 annually
tax free (plus food stamps, health care, and other subisides), but that a family head
working alone could not have made that much at $2.00 to $2.50 per hour. He
therefore concluded that, "it is unlikely that persons eligible for welfare benefits
95
would work for the wages that the majority of illegal aliens receive."
In another example of revisionist thinking, Michael Piore, an M.I.T. economist, provided a more controversial perspective. By holding wages down, he
argued, illegals encouraged labor-intensive industries to remain in a given place
and to discourage automation. "In this sense, the presence of aliens serves to preserve native jobs." And he warned, "any wholesale attempt to end the migration
9
is, therefore, likely to be exceedingly disruptive to the operations of the society." 6
This argument, elaborated in subsequent writings and in congressional testimony,
seemed to match the warnings of Cornelius, Bustamante, and Mexican officials
that any police-like cutoff of transborder labor migration would threaten economic
stability in Mexico and civil liberties in both countries. From this perspective the
only justified action, if any, would be a massive work permit program or some
97
form of mass amnesty.
92. See M. VILLALPANDO, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (1977); Breiter & Barcel6, Hipanicson Wefare." The Facts and the Figures, AGENDA,
Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 4, 4-10; Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy TowardMexico." An HistorcalPerspectwe,
CHICANO L. REV., Summer 1975, at 66,80-81, 88-89; M. Piore, Undocumented Workers and United States
Immigration Policy (M.I.T. offprint 1976).
93.
94.

M. VILLALPANDO, supra note 92, at 53-61.
Id at 58-60.

Id at 60-61.
Piore, Illegal Immigration to the United States.- Some Observations and Policy Suggestions, in NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON EMPLOYMENT POLICY, ILLEGAL ALIENS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES 28 (1976).
97. Id For Piore's full interpretation of the economic role of immigrant labor in the U.S. economy,
95.
96.

see M. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1979). Cf Corwin,
Mexican Poliy and Ambivalence Toward Labor Emigration to the United States, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS:

PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 176,

(A. Corwin ed. 1978) (delineating Mexican officials' position).

201-02, 208-09

Page 223: Spring 1982]

THE NUMBERS GAME

On the other hand, there are researchers, including North and Houstoun, who
acknowledge both the need of some employers for alien labor and the exaggerations of the restrictionists, and yet insist that illegal aliens undermine wage and
labor standards, force local labor either to move out or to go on social assistance,
and sooner or later settle down and compete for the better jobs.
With respect to Mexican illegals in particular, economists Vernon M. Briggs,
Walter F. Fogel, and Fred H. Schmidt, and political scientist Richard Sterling,
have emphasized that the Mexican influx is so massive and so concentrated in
certain economic sectors such as field labor and in certain geographical regions
such as the southwestern border states that even yesterday's "wetback" is adversely
affected. 98 Ray Marshall, University of Texas labor economist, rejected facile
comparisons between Europe's guestworkers and the massive border spillover from
Mexico. He maintained that the massive presence of illegal aliens from Mexico
and other Third World countries made it virtually impossible to bring down
American unemployment rates.9 9 Later, speaking as Secretary of Labor in the
Carter administration, Marshall estimated in 1980 that if all illegal jobholders
could be removed, the national rate of unemployment would drop to 4%. 10 It was
then around 7%. More recently, Donald Huddle, who researched the boomtown
Houston area, has suggested that the Federal Government itself is a major
employer of illegal aliens through a system that favors contractors who make lower
bids on construction projects because of illegals in the work crews.101
The Select Commission was charged with assessing, among other things, the
socioeconomic impact of immigrants. It solicited a number of significant studies
from immigration and labor experts, but it did not itself undertake any field
studies of illegal residents, nor provide funding for such studies. , 02 This was partly
because much more was expected from the major field surveys then being undertaken by Reyes Associates, by Mexico's CENIET surveys, and from the 1980
census. In any event, SCIRP has been criticized for not generating studies leading
to more empirical data about illegal aliens. 10 3 Moreover, it has been faulted for
reaching policy recommendations-such as amnesty for illegals who entered the
country before 1980, higher immigration ceilings, and a special one-time allotment
of 500,000 visas--to absorb illegal alien pressures when no firm demographic data
98. See V. BRIGGS, W. FOGEL & F. SCHMIDT, THE CHICANO WORKER 93 (1977); W. FOGEL, supra
note 12, at 154-58; Briggs, Mexican Workers in the United States Labor Market.. A Contemporay Dilemma, 112
INT'L LAB. REV. 351, 361-62 (1975); R. Sterling, International Labor Markets: The United States-Mexican Case 1-5 (Sept. 1974) (unpublished manuscript).
99. Marshall, Economic Factors Infinencing the InternationalMigration of Workers, in VIEWS ACROSS THE
BORDER: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 175-77 (S. Ross ed. 1978); see also What Illegal Aliens Cost the
Economy, Bus. WK., June 13, 1977, at 86, 87.
100. See Funds to HelpJobless Scraping Bottom, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30, 1980, at 66; see also
F. MARSHALL, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: THE PROBLEM, THE SOLUTIONS (FAIR Immigration Paper No. 3,
1982); Immigration Law Reform, San Francisco Chron., May 26, 1981, at 4A, col. 1 (editorial).
101. Press release on research findings of Professor Donald Huddle, Dep't of Economics, Rice University (Oct. 1981).
102. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
103. See Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 457, 467, 511, 524-25, 530-31, 535 (opinions of L. Bouvier,
Population Reference Bureau; D. North, New Transcentury Foundation; and Michael Teitelbaum, Ford
Foundation).
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was available on the size of the illegal alien population or on the number of imme04
diate relatives that might be brought in by legalized aliens.
Other studies that provide socioeconomic profiles of certain illegal alien groups
have continued to emerge. David S. North's Government Records. What They Tell Us
About the Role of Illegal Immigrants i'n the Labor Market and Income Transfer Programs,105
is a revealing followup study of a group of 580 illegal aliens, mostly Mexican, who
were originally apprehended in 1975 and whose identity and contacts with various
income transfer programs and the labor market could be traced through INS
apprehension records and valid social security numbers.
Among North's findings were the following: a high rate of return to the U.S.
labor market after apprehension (for example, of 192 members of the study group
apprehended in California, 147 subsequently had earnings recorded by the California state unemployment insurance system); a high rate of filing for unemployment benefits but not social security benefits; a high rate of having taxes deducted
from paychecks; a low rate of acquiring legal status and U.S. citizenship; longer
duration of stays; and a continuing pattern of lower wage levels for illegal workers.
The North study also contains a convenient listing of other important socioeconomic surveys of illegal alien groups as seen in table 14.
The above listing of field studies, together with the research of North and
others, helps fill in a socioeconomic profile of illegal aliens. It also serves to suggest
to what extent illegal aliens-especially the Mexican migrant labor class-may be
using tax-supported services. Still, one finds virtually no available data on the
extent to which any "undocumented" groups use private philanthropic services
such as Catholic and Protestant migrant ministries, community funds like United
Way, or adult education programs. Moreover, there is at most only fragmentary
data on "undetected" aliens and their families who commonly use costly public
assistance programs, such as public health services, public education, public
housing, and food stamps."°6
One notable exception to this general lack of data is a major study of Mexican
aliens in San Diego County that builds on the earlier study by Villalpando and
associates. i07 Prepared for the county government by Community Research Associates in May, 1980, UndocumentedImmtgrants." Their Impact on the County of San Diego
is in some ways a model of informative research about elusive illegal aliens. 108
Aside from information collected from numerous federal, state, and county agencies, trained Spanish-speaking researchers used a variety of research methods and
104.

Id

105.

D.

NORTH, GOVERNMENT RECORDS:

WHAT THEY TELL Us ABOUT THE ROLE OF ILLEGAL

IMMIGRANTS IN THE LABOR MARKET AND INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS (1981)

(prepared for U.S.
Dep't of Labor, with assistance of J. Wagner).
106. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL (GAO), REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
ILLEGAL ALIENS: ESTIMATING THEIR IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 2 (1980); see also A. Corwin, A
Tale of Woe: Report on Immigration Manpower Needs in Select Areas (Apr. 20, 1981) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for Hoover Institution) (reporting author's interviews with immigration officers and
border patrolmen during winter and spring of 1981).
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
108. In the preparation of this study, William Bramberger served as a subcontractor, Alfredo Velasco
as a consultant, and Alberto Attia as an associate researcher. Other individual participants in the study
were too numerous to mention.
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informant samples of various sizes.10 9 Some of the results are as follows. There
were an estimated 25,000 to 48,000 illegal immigrants living in San Diego County.
Of these between 13,000 to 25,000 held jobs in the regional labor force, contributing possibly 0.5% to the local unemployment rate. The removal of these
undocumented workers would presumably involve short-term disruptions in the
regional economy, particularly in the agri-labor sector where they made up 34% to
59% of the hired labor force, and in the restaurant and hotel-motel business. In
1979, these workers paid an estimated $5,900,000 to $11,800,000 in job-related
taxes and insurance, but illegal agri-workers probably paid no federal or state
income tax. One third of the firms surveyed in San Diego and Orange counties
were found to be violating minimum wage and overtime standards.
The monetary impact of illegal aliens on the county welfare system was minimal because, unlike most other states, California requires proof of legal residency
or citizenship before benefits are issued. 110 The total unpaid billings for all the
hospitals in the county ranged from $4,400,000 to $8,200,000. The estimated
undocumented student population in county schools, from kindergarten through
twelfth grade, ranged from 6,034 to 11,662. The cost of schooling illegals ran from
an estimated $10,900,000 to $21,000,000, or from 1.9% to 3.7% of the total county
school costs. In fiscal 1979, over 384,000 illegal entrants were arrested in the borderline counties of San Diego and Imperial. Of that number 9,811 were remanded
to the U.S. Marshal. These persons comprised 85% of the prisoners in the Metropolitan Correctional Center; of that percentage, material witnesses accounted for
52%, alien smugglers for 15%, with fraudulent documents and illegal re-entry cases
constituting the remainder.
Local government officials are increasingly concerned with the social and
labor-displacement costs associated with uncontrolled migration. A significant
indicator of this concern is a detailed socioeconomic profile of the undocumented
Mexican migrant population of Texas. This study was hurriedly done in MarchJuly 1982 for the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Aliens by Lance Tarrance and
Associates, specialists in public-opinion surveys. l ' Using random samples, the
researchers interviewed 1,443 migrant workers apprehended by the Immigration
Service and 2,312 informants throughout the state-including 620 citizens of U.S.Hispanic descent-to help fill out the social profile. Among the findings, about
60% of undocumented workers would choose a "temporary work permit" if given
109. The samples included 50 undetected aliens, 405 "Silva cases," 665 aliens in the Metropolitan
Correctional Facility, and 187 employers. Community Research Associates, Undocumented Immigrants:
Their Impact on the County of San Diego (May 1980) (prepared for county government). "Silva cases"
are quasi-legal Mexican workers, usually with families in the United States, who remain in this country
under stays of deportation while the Immigration Service determines their eligibility for "recaptured visas"
mistakenly awarded to Cuban immigrants prior to 1976. Silva-case families were generally quite willing to
be interviewed, thus presenting Community Research Associates with an unusual research opportunity.
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11104 (West 1980).
Regulations promulgated under this statute require the alien to submit Form CA-6 ("Alien Status
Verification"). The statute provides that benefits are obtainable upon the filing of certification, but entitlements are subject to confirmation of status by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id.
S11. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, STATE OF TEX., A STUDY OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN THE
STATE OF TEXAS, MARCH-JULY 1982 (F. Newport, Director 1982).
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1 2

the chance. 1
Policymakers in the United States and Mexico thus have at hand a substantial
accumulation of socioeconomic information about "undocumented" Mexicans
who are commonly thought to constitute around 60% of all illegal aliens in the
United States. The problem is that there is no comparable profile information
about other fast-growing groups of illegal aliens, such as Filipinos, Orientals,
Colombians, Haitians, Dominicans, or Salvadorans, although occasionally a study
3
is concerned with some of these groups."1
VII
THE MEXICO SIDE OF THE "NUMBERS GAME"

A.

Official Attitudes of the Mexican Government

Mexican officials and editorialists were alarmed at the rapid emergence of an
immigration restrictionist movement in the United States during the early 1970's.
Of particular concern were the Rodino bills during the period 1971-1975 that
would have applied sanctions to employers of illegal aliens.' "4 Facing a population
explosion and a serious trade deficit with the United States, Mexican authorities
were determined to keep open a border safety valve.
In the fall of 1972, through the initiative of President Luis Echeverria, both
governments agreed to set up interagency study groups to examine independently
migrant labor problems and to exchange proposals on what could be done through
binational cooperation.' 15 An interagency Commission for the Study of Surreptitious Labor Emigration was thereupon established in Mexico's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The Nixon administration set up a similar group, the so-called Cramton
Commission.
Foremost in the mind of the Mexican Government was protecting Mexican
access to jobs in the United States. It also wanted the most humane treatment
possible for deportees and American assistance in collecting unpaid wages. President Echeverria also sought to revive the binational Bracero labor program abandoned by the American Government in 1964. The Cramton Commission had
principally in mind greater cooperation from Mexican officials in controlling
16
illegal migration and alien smuggling."
In spite of an increased number of consular offices in the United States, the
112. Id at 5-9, 155-56, 165.
113. Stepick, Root Causes of Hai tian Migraton, in Immiration Reform. HearngsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and InternationalLaw of the House Comm on the.judzciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 698-762 (1982).
For a guide to other academic and government works that seek to assess the socioeconomic impact of
"undocumented" immigrants, see J. VIALET, supra note 2. See also U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra
note 106; U.S. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT (L. Fuchs ed. 1981).
114. See J. Vialet, Illegal/Undocumented Aliens 4-5 (July 31, 1981) (Issue Brief 74137, Congressional
Research Service); see also Corwin, supra note 97, at 202.
115. Corwin, supra note 97, at 197, 199.
116. See OFFICE OF ATr'Y GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE AND
HUMANE ACTION ON ILLEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP 1-

8 (1973) (R. Cramton, Chairman).
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Mexican government in 1972 had practically no statistical knowledge of Mexicans
furtively there. At that time, Mexican government agencies were no more prepared to do research on illegal migration than American agencies. For statistical
information about Mexicans illegally in the United States both governments had
to turn to the INS which could only provide rising apprehension figures. These
always alarmed sensitive Mexican nationalists. Arrests of Mexican citizens by the
hated Mzgra (Mexican slang for the INS) shot upwards from 55,349 in fiscal year
1965, when the Bracero program ended, to 430,200 in fiscal year 1972, with no sign
1 7
of a letup. 1
Mexican officials decided they wanted their own independent statistical evaluation of the "new wetback problem" in the United States. Consequently, for the
first time, the Mexican Government, through its interagency commission, undertook serious research on -the phenomenon of surreptitious emigration. It was
decided that the simplest way to gather field information was to interview Mexican deportees unloaded at specific points in Mexico by the American immigration
officers under the nonpenalty "voluntary departure" system. During the period
1972-1974, study commission officials gathered interviews from more than 3,000
deportees. In addition, consular officers and researchers from ministries, such as
Labor and Social Welfare, contributed special reports to the commissioners. " 8
The commission found that depending on the season, an estimated 1,000,000 to
2,000,000 compatriots lacking proper authorization were working or seeking work
in the neighboring republic. Around 1973, these people were sending home somewhere near $1,000,000 a year, in addition to whatever they carried on their person.
Wage averages of deportees, most of whom were unskilled or semiskilled workers in
agri-industries, were somewhat less than $1.50 an hour. The American minimum
wage then was from $2.00 to $2.50 an hour (but some migrant workers were given
room and board free). Wages were notably higher in the interior of the United
States and notably lower in an immediate border area flooded with Mexican
labor. 119
Most informants, nearly all males, were originally rural campesinos whose subsistence village economy had come to depend on dollar earnings. When the
Bracero program closed in 1964, and indeed long before that, they simply continued to migrate to the United States, with or without permiso. The typical age
group was sixteen to thirty. Mexican officials were shocked to learn that in this
category were grown men who had never tried to work in Mexico. They uniformly
protested their love for la rmadre patria but complained of low wages for unskilled
labor in Mexico, then from $1.00 to $5.00 per day in U.S. currency. Everyone
knew, they explained, about the good wages on the other side. Although Mexican
officials promised that el Presidenle would provide jobs for repatriates in new industrial and agricultural programs, apparently most deportees were determined to
117. Corwin, supra note 97, at 196-98.
118. Interviews with members of Mexico's Intersecretarial Commission on Surreptitious Emigration,
in Mexico City (Apr. 3 & 10, 1975).
119. See CoMisI6N INTERSECRETARIAL PARA ESTUDIO DEL PROBLEMA DE LA EMIGRACi6N SUBREPTICIA DE TRABAJADORES MEXICANOS, INFORME DE ACTIVIDADES Y RECOMENDACIONES 9-14 (1972).
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return to the United States "just as soon as they finished lunch." 2 0
The study commission found also that many deportees were no longer content
with agri-labor in the United States but were seeking higher wages in service and
industrial employment there. They learned further from deportees and consular
reports that better-paid Mexican nationals in services and industries were largely
going undetected in the American economy, and that increasingly Mexican industrial workers were leaving jobs in Mexico for better wages in the American labor
riarket.
TABLE

15

TYPE OF JOB HELD IN MEXICO BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
RECENTLY DEPORTED BY U.S. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES
(IN PERCENTAGES)
Type of Job
Employer or business owner
Self employed
Land holder (ejidatario)
Landless agri-worker
Industrial worker
Services worker
Wageless family worker
Never employed before
Total
n =

1972

1974

1.7
5.5

2.2
6.1

2.7
7.1

4.4
43.1
15.8

12.9
35.1
18.0

4.3
35.6
21.5

17.8
5.7
6.1
100.0
2,791

18.0
4.0
4.2
100.0
1,316

18.6
3.9
6.3
100.0
1,658

1975

n = number of interviewees
Source: Results from interviews with Mexican deportees in eight border cities in 1972, 1974, and
1975, done by Comisi6n Intersecretarial para el Estudio del Problema de la Emigraci6n Subrepticia de Trabajadores Mexicanos a Estados Unidos de Am6rica, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Adapted From Bustamante, Undocumented Immigration From Mexco." Research
Report, 11 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 162 (1977).

With this new information in hand, and considering the dramatic increase in
arrests of Mexican nationals by the INS (709,459 in fiscal 1974 alone), Mexican
officials no longer saw much point in insisting on a renewed Bracero program for
perhaps 200,000 or 300,000 agri-workers. Such an arrangement obviously would
not cover better-paid mqj'ados ("wetbacks") already in industrial and service work
abroad, nor legalize more than a small part of the campesinos seeking agribusiness
work in the United States.
In a border meeting in October, 1974, President Echeverria told President
Ford that Mexico was no longer actively seeking a new contract labor program. 12'
By then the Mexican Government had decided to develop labor-intensive industries to absorb surplus labor and to concentrate its emigration policy on protecting
120. Interview with Juan Barona Lobato, Director of Migratory Affairs, Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Relations, Mexico City (Jan. 21 & 31, 1974); Interview with Victor Ramirez, Deputy Director of Human
Development Studies, Institutio de Estudios Politicos, Econ6micos, y Sociales, Mexico City (Feb. 12, 1974).
121. Corwin, supra note 97, at 199-200.
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its vested interest in the U.S. labor market. The official position became explicit:
there are no illegals in the United States, and no apologies. There are only
"undocumented workers" who subsidize the American economy and the American
welfare state, and who deserve full human rights. Thereafter Mexico's protectionist strategy included pressing American officials to accept the term "undocumented worker" and a concept of international labor rights much like that
recommended for European "guest workers" by the Geneva based International
22
Labour Organization. 1
Mexican officials and negotiators could now use their own statistical facts to
serve protectionist needs. For example, they challenged the "exaggerated" 1975
estimate of the Lesko study that an estimated 5,200,000 Mexicans were settled
illegally in the United States, as well as the common estimate of American immigration officials that 60% or more of the annual inflow of permanent illegal settlers
were of Mexican origin. Mexican data indicated that in many cases the same
undocumented workers were repeatedly arrested while attempting to reach job
sites in the United States, thus leading to a grossly exaggerated view of the "Mex23
ican invasion" as reflected in U.S. apprehension statistics.1
In this manner, Mexican officials contested the meaning of the "alarmist"
immigration-arrest figures circulated during the recession of 1973-1975 by the INS
under Commissioner Chapman. Just as the Commissioner played up Mexican
apprehensions to get more enforcement legislation and resources, the Mexican government began using statistics to play down enforcement needs, keeping its safety
valve open.
B.

Revisionist Studies

After 1974 Mexico's position on undocumented nationals in the United States
was reinforced and publicized by an emerging group of revisionist scholars. Chief
among the revisionists is Mexico's Jorge Bustamante, a professor of sociology at El
Colegio de Mexico, a center of graduate studies and research in the social sciences
in Mexico City. Bustamante, who has a doctoral degree in sociology from the
University of Notre Dame and who has been associated with the Chicano Studies
Center there, established himself during the Echeverria administration (19701976) as Mexico's leading authority on emigration studies. He is also foremost
among a new genre of advocate scholars who seek to change government policies
in both countries and defend the international rights of the working class at home
and abroad.
While doing participant-observer research on mojado emigration in 1969, Bustamante himself crossed the Texas border as a "wetback." Since then he has interviewed large samples of Mexican deportees and voluntary returnees, and has
written numerous chapters, reports, and position papers. In 1975, Dr. Bustamante
became President Echeverria's chief consultant on labor emigration to the United
122. Id. at 203; see also Excelsior (Mexico City), Nov. 18, 1976, at 19A.
123. Interview with Juan Barona Lobato, supra note 120; Interview with Victor Ramirez, supra
note 120.

Page 223: Spring 1982]

THE NUMBERS GAME

States. Later, as head of the Center for Border Studies of Northern Mexico, he
124
directed a series of border research studies.
Bustamante's findings supported the Mexican official view that most undocumented border crossers were either cyclic agri-workers or unskilled and semi-skilled
workers in the U.S. secondary labor market, and in neither case did they pose a
serious competitive threat to American workers. Nor were they a burden on American tax-supported services. In one study of several hundred deportees, Bustamante found that only 2.3% had used welfare services and only 7.8% had used
public health services. 125 Professor Bustamante's research is especially valuable for
demonstrating the growing links of interdependency between the American labor
market and Mexico's migrant labor force, as suggested by the following table.
Meanwhile, Bustamante developed a neo-Marxist interpretation of labor emigration from Third World countries which is widely shared by Mexican and
Chicano leaders of la Raza. According to this thesis, Mexico has historically provided, and still provides, the main source of proletarian immigrant labor for the
development of the American Southwest and many special sectors of the American
economy, including agriculture, railroads, mines, garment shops, and factories, as
well as maintenance, construction, and service industries, including domestic
service. The unpaid surplus value of Raza labor serves to increase American corporate wealth and capitalist expansion both in the United States and in Mexico
itself. In turn, this contributes to maintaining a colonial relationship between the
two countries, at the same time serving to support a privileged standard of living
for the Anglo-American capitalist class, and, incidentally, for Mexico's collaborating elite. 126
By doing work that Americans refuse to do, by laboring at low wages, by
paying taxes in most cases, and by making little use of American social services,
Mexico's undocumented migrant workers (unable to survive at home in a regressive colonialist structure) provide a major subsidy for the American economy that
neither government can ignore. From this fact is derived, in Bustamante's term,
"the rights of the undocumented taxpayers." To this is added a "moral right" to
an open border since the American imperialists expropriated Mexican territory in
1848.127 Adhering to this interpretation, Mexican and Chicano labor organiza124.

See Corwin, The Study and Interpretation of Mexican Labor Migraton. An Introduction, in IMMI-

GRANTS--AND IMMIGRANTS:

PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

11 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
125. Bustamante, Undocumented ImmigrationfromMexico. Research Report, 11 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 170
(1977); see supra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
126. Bustamante, Commodity Mgrants. A Structual Analysis of Mexican Immigration to the United States, in
VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 183 (S. Ross ed. 1978).
127. Id; see also Bustamante, The Historical Context of the Undocumented Immigrationfrom Mexico to the
United States, 3 AZTLAN-INT'L J. CHICANO STUD. RESEARCH 257 (1972).
For a survey of similar Chicano interpretations, and of contrasting "establishment school" approaches,
see Corwin, Mexican-American Histot,." An Assessment, in THE CHICANO 1, 6-8, 32-33, 36, 40 (N. Hundley ed.
1975).
Perhaps the most extreme formulation of Chicano ideology is that which regards the Anglo-American
United States citizen as the true illegal alien. See R. ACUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA:

STRUGGLE TOWARD LIBERATION 210, 220-31, 274-77 (1972).

THE CHICANO'S
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tions, who seek to achieve a transborder solidarity movement and free access to
either labor market have declared a sweeping "Bill of Rights for Undocumented
28
Workers."1
Another revisionist thesis, also giving support to the official Mexican view that
American officials, legislators, and labor leaders tend to exaggerate the numbers
and the adverse social impact of Mexican immigrants, has been developed by Dr.
Wayne Cornelius. Dr. Cornelius, a political scientist, was at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and now is at the University of California, San Diego, where he
directs the Center for United States-Mexican Studies. Since 1973, Dr. Cornelius
has done extensive field studies particularly of villages in the State of Jalisco from
which three generations of seasonal workers have come to the United States. Like
Bustamante, Cornelius holds that such migrants are no serious threat to the American job market because they do low-pay, short-term work that for the most part
requires great mobility, and because they return cyclically to Mexico. Both
researchers tend to ignore other currents of permanent Mexican immigration to
29
the United States.'
According to the Cornelius profile, migrants from Jalisco villages, and other
central Mexico villages, are mostly younger men who, if married, leave their families behind. They save a high percentage of their earnings and make very little use
of American social, health, or educational services. Returning to Mexico, they use
their savings to advance small business or property interests. 130 (One might here
question whether or not these small proprietors, landholders, tradesmen, and shopkeepers are typical of the "landless lumpenproletariat" found in so many other
parts of Mexico and along the Mexico-U.S. border.)
Unlike Bustamante, who tends to stress capitalist exploitation of a defenseless
labor class, Dr. Cornelius emphasizes that both countries benefit from this symbiotic form of foreign aid. Also, according to the thesis, any attempt by American
authorities to cut off the flow of cyclic migrants would be counterproductive, 13 1
serving only to profit alien smugglers and to force Mexican migrants to settle down
on the American side. Instead of trying to stop it, why not regulate it? After all,
nearly three quarters of the Jalisco migrant workers studied by Cornelius returned
to their native villages.
Professor Cornelius, who has urged his interpretations in position papers.and in
128. Apart from the labor organizations, Chicano rights organizations, legal services offices in the
barrios and colonias, and other groups with a protectionist mission commonly circulate declarations of
rights of the undocumented international worker. Such groups include the Chicano Awareness Center of
Omaha, the Committee on Chicano Rights, Inc., of National City, Cal., the Legal Aid Society of San
Diego, the Manzo Area Council of the Legal Service Center of Tucson, and Centro Aztlan of Houston.
129. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
130.

See W. CORNELIUS, ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES:

A SUMMARY OF

RECENT FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 8-13 (M.I.T. Center for Int'l Studies 1977); W. CORNELIUS,
MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND U.S. RESPONSES 5-9, 2939 (M.I.T. Center for Int'l Studies 1978); W. CORNELIUS & J. DIAz CANEDO, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES: THE VIEW FROM THE RURAL SENDING COMMUNITIES 31-41 (M.I.T. Center for
Int'l Studies 1976).
131. For the gist of Cornelius' arguments against cutting off the migrant Mexican labor flow, see W.
CORNELIUS, ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, supra note 130, at 8; W. CORNELIUS

& J. DIAZ CANEDO, supra note 130, at 44-49.
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congressional testimony, would have the American Government issue 750,000
Mexican labor permits according to seasonal demand as a means of solving most of
the border migration-control problem. That number would cover most of the perennial migrants or "repeaters," and would also liberate the Border Patrol from a
fruitless and thankless task. 132 According to Cornelius, an appropriate month-bymonth distribution of visas issued during the first year of the system would be as
follows:
TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF VISAS

Maximum number of Visas to be issued:

Month:
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
TOTAL:
Source:

50,000
200,000
200,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
25,000
25,000
0
0
0
750,000

Cornelius, Legalzing the Flow of Temporagy Migrant Workersfrom Mexico.- A Proposal, in U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:

APPENDIX F TO STAFF REPORT

OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, PAPERS ON TEMPORARY WORKERS 315 (1981).

When the President of Mexico, Jose Lopez Portillo, inaugurated in November
1976, met with American president Jimmy Carter in February 1977, he presented
the Mexican side of the argument using some elements of the Bustamante and
Cornelius theses. Lopez Portillo vehemently opposed any "police solutions" to the
border control problem. He warned an impressionable Carter that to cut off the
escape valve for Mexican labor emigration would be economically harmful for
both countries, and could even lead to serious, perhaps revolutionary, political
repercussions in Mexico.' 33 The Mexican president urged Carter not to raise the
level of immigration enforcement while Mexico sought "a long range solution" by
promoting industrial development and family planning. He did agree, however,
to cooperate with American officials in the pursuit of alien smugglers who, increasingly, were transporting Central Americans and South Americans across Mexico
34
to the porous American frontier.1
132. Cornelius, Legahiing the Flow of Temporary Migrant Workers fom Mexico. A Proposal, in Appendix F
to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 315; see also W. CORNELIUS, BUILDING THE CACTUS CURTAIN:
MEXICO AND U.S. RESPONSES FROM WILSON TO CARTER (forthcoming); Bustamante, Mexican Undocumented Immigration: A 'Domestc'Problem, MIGRATION TODAY, June 1978, at 7, 7-10; Cornelius, Undocumented

Immiration." A Crtiqueof the CanerAdmiutraton's Polcy Proposals, MIGRATION TODAY, Oct. 1977, at 5, 5-8,
16-20.
133.
134.

See Corwin, supra note 97, at 206-11; Corwin, supra note 86, at 331-32.
See Corwin, supra note 86, at 331.
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In August 1977, the Carter administration proposed not only an amnesty program for Mexican and other illegal aliens, but a higher level of border patrol
enforcement as well. 1 35 Adverse public opinion on amnesty and the opposition to
immigration law enforcement by spokespersons for the Hispanic vote, together
with confirmation of huge oil discoveries in Mexico, led both governments to agree
that the whole subject of immigration policy deserved less action and more study.
In the United States this took the form of the President's Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) (1978-1981) and in Mexico the
CENIET surveys (1978-1980).
C.

Mexico's CENIET Surveys

In 1977 a number of social scientists proposed that the Mexican Government
sponsor and fund the most complete field surveys ever undertaken of Mexican
labor migration to the-United States. The administration of President Lopez Portillo agreed with the proposal because of the fear that the growing importance of
both legal and "undocumented" emigrant workers to the Mexican national
economy and the controversy surrounding "exaggerated numbers" might lead to
unwarranted restrictive measures against Mexican migrants by the American Government. Consequently, the National Center for Labor Information and Statistics
(Centro Nacional de Informaci6n y Estadistica del Trabajo), a research agency
associated with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaria del Trabajo y
Prevision Social) became the coordinating center for the so-called CENIET
Surveys.' 36 Essentially, the surveys sought to determine how many Mexican
workers legally or illegally crossed the U.S. border annually, and how many actually remained in the United States more or less permanently. The surveys also
hoped to determine the economic character and importance of internal and
external labor migration to Mexico's economy.
While the CENIET surveys were the result of careful, collaborative efforts
involving sociologists, demographers, economists, political scientists, government
employees, and hundreds of interview trainees, three revisionist scholars with a
keen interest in public policy had a special influence in shaping the monumental
design: Jorge Bustamante,137 Manual Garcia y Griego, 38 a Mexican-American
39
demographer, and Wayne Cornelius.1
In the primary stage elaborate samples of migration histories were collected in
a "First Border Survey" in October-November 1977. Data was collected from two
groups: apprehended persons returned to Mexican border port-of-entry by American immigration officers, and a smaller group of voluntary returns. Special attention was given to the duration of stay in the United States, type of employment,
payroll deductions, if any, use of social services, and voluntariness of return. Inter135. President's Message to Congress on Undocumented Aliens, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1170,
1171, 1174-75, (Aug. 4, 1977).
136. For information about development of the CENIET surveys, see APPROACHES, supra note 49.
137. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
138. Mexican-American demographer, associated with El Colegio.
139. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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view data was compared to INS deportation figures for Mexican aliens during
period 1970-1977. In order to have a more comparative and current view of the
annual flow cycle, research teams collected more migration histories during a
"Second Border Survey" from August 1978 to May 1979. In all, about 35,000
deportees and voluntary returnees were interviewed in the two surveys. Thus
CENIET researchers gathered more interviews than all previous surveys of
"undocumented" Mexican workers.140
The preliminary findings of the CENIET border surveys were first released in
December 1979 and slightly revised in 1980. According to the surveys, the estimated gross annual flow of Mexican nationals, legal and illegal, to the United
States between 1972 and 1976 ranged between 629,000 and 2,043,000, depending
on the season. However, the net annual flow of deportable Mexican workers to the
United States was estimated to be much lower: 50,000 to 158,000. Here one must
take into account that the net flow figures were for January, a low point of Mexican seasonal labor migration, and apparently did not include family members.
Also, one should note that the net flow estimates for 1976 alone were notably
higher: 113,000 to 284,000. In any case, according to CENIET authors, only a
small percentage of the annual emigration flow of "undocumented" Mexican
migrants actually remained in the United States.
TABLE

18

ESTIMATES OF GROSS AND NET FLOW OF DEPORTABLE MEXICANS IN
THE U.S.,

1972-1977

(THOUSANDS)
Net Flow**

Gross Flow*
Low

High

1972

645

1497

12

39

1973
1974
1975
1976

545
651
680
799

1770
2139
2239
2591

28
20
75
113

131
77
256
284

Average

629

2043

50

158

*
**

Low

High

YEAR

Entries into deportable status.
The difference between entries and exits from deportable status.

Source:

M.

GARCiA Y GRIEGO, EL VOLUMEN

MENTADOS A LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

DE LA MIGRACION
NEUVAS HIPOTESIS

DE MEXICANOS

NO DOCU-

Table 5.2 (1980).

The CENIET border surveys' estimate of the deportable Mexican stock population living more or less permanently in the United States in January 1977, and
presumably including family members was estimated to range from 482,000 to
1,224,000.
Demographers with the U.S. Census Bureau, believing that the CENIET
140.

See

APPROACHES,

supra note 49, at 103-04.
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figure for the deportable Mexican stock population was unrealistically low, made a
TABLE 19
ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF DEPORTABLE MEXICANS IN THE
UNITED STATES

1972-1977

(THOUSANDS)

M. GARCiA

436
476

234
246
274
294
369
482

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
* Estimates for January of each year.
Source:

HIGH

LOW

YEAR*

Y GRIEGO, EL VOLUMEN

MENTADOS A LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

606
684
940
1,224

DE LA MIGRACION
NEUVAS

DE MEXICANOS

NO DOCU-

HIPOTESIS Table 5.1 (1980).

recalculation of the CENIET estimate based on alternative reasonable assumptions concerning projected return rates to Mexico and came up with a higher estimate for January 1977: 700,000 to 2,200,000.141
A common criticism of border town surveys of returning migrants and deportees, seasonal laborers for the most part, is that they tend to ignore deportable
nationals who settle, along with family members, on the American side in higherpay, year-round industrial and service jobs. To meet this criticism and to fill an
informational void, the CENIET researchers were prepared to move into a second
stage of research even more impressive in scope than the first stage. Stage two
involved a "National Household Survey of Emigration to the Northern Border
and to the United States" that was carried out December 1978 through January
1979, in communities that historically have sent countless workers and families
over the border. These communities include those in the central states of Guanajuato, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Jalisco, and Zacatecas and the border state of
Chihuahua. Some 60,000 households in 115 different localities were visited by
interview teams and asked whether any members of the household age fifteen years
or older, documented or undocumented, were presently working in the United
States or looking for work there.1 42 The Mexican national household survey estimated that the number of Mexican nationals, legal or "undocumented," age
fifteen or over, at work or looking for work in the United States, and who habitually
reside in Mexico was, as of January 1979, around 405,000.
141.
142.

Siegel, supra note 17, at 16.
For accounts of the National

TRABAJADORES

EN LOS

Household survey, see C. ZAZUETA & R. CORONA,

ESTADOS UNIDOS:

PRIMEROS

RESULTADOS

DE

LA' ENCUESTA

NACIONAL

LOS
DE

EMIGRACI6N (1979); C. Zazueta, Mexican Workers in the United States: Some Initial Results and Methodological Considerations of the National Household Survey on Migration (Jan. 1980) (unpublished paper
prepared for Working Groups on Mexican Migrants and U.S. Responsibility, Univ. of Maryland Center
for Philosophy and Public Policy).
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TABLE

20

ESTIMATED MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN

1978

DECEMBER,
AGE GROUPS
15
10
25
30
40

-

MALES

FEMALES

79,889
106,042
67,075
74,892
47,674

62,767
91,812
57,660
69,222
40,756

17,122
14,230
9,415
7,670
6,918

13,301
9,560
5,424

11,903
8,204
4,794

1,398
1,356
630

1,610

1,288

322

405,467

346,406

59,061

50 - 54
55 - 59
60 years and over
Not reported
*

1979*

TOTAL

19 years
24
29
39
49

TOTAL

AND IN JANUARY,

Legal and "undocumented."

Source:

Adapted from CENIET data, Encuesta Nactonal de Emtgracion a la FronleraNorte del Patisy a

los Estados Unidos (ENEFNEU), Table Population V (1978-1979).

Hardly any serious students of Mexican immigration to the United States
accepted the low range of certain CENIET estimates. Census Bureau demographers Siegel, Passel, and Robinson pointed out some of the possible defects. For
example, during December-January when the household surveys took place the
outflow of Mexican workers would be at a minimum and the backflow at a maximum, because hundreds of thousands of legal and illegal migrants spend
Christmas and most of the winter in Mexico. Moreover, since the questionnaires
asked only about household members age fifteen or over at work in the United
States, persons under fifteen as well as old people and housewives residing in the
United States would not have been counted. In addition, there would have been
a natural reluctance to report household members working illegally in the United
States.
According to INS data, around 480,000 Mexicans were admitted as legal
immigrants to the United States in the period July 1, 1969 to September 30, 1977.
Possibly half of these were in the labor force as seasonal or permanent workers.
Also, in 1977 some 930,000 legal Mexican immigrants registered under the Alien
Address Program of the Immigration Service. Possibly half of this accumulated
number were in the U.S. labor market, and would include an unknown percentage
who actually reside part-time in Mexico. Given the foregoing data and considerations, and the fact that CENIET researchers were counting both legal and
"undocumented" Mexicans in the United States, the Census Bureau demographers could only conclude, half in jest, that perhaps the Mexican national survey
succeeded in counting only those Mexican nationals who had a "green card," or
143
legal resident alien status.
In fact, there is considerable evidence that large groups of Mexican "immi143.

Siegel, supra note 17, at 25-28.
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grants" admitted legally to the United States, even those who register annually'as
U.S. resident aliens, actually live in Mexico much of the year. Cornelius, in his
extensive field studies of villages in the state of Jalisco, found that for several generations some village dwellers have gone to labor in the United States. Nearly all
of them return seasonally and eventually permanently, even though many possess
a permanent resident alien card which they regard more as a work permit than a
residence permit. 44 Reichert and Massey found a similar migratory backflow in
their 1979 study of a village in the central Mexican state of Michoacan. Of 465
families, over three-fourths depended on migrant income from the United States.
Two-thirds of the migrants had F-151 immigration cards (green cards), some of
them acquired fraudulently. Since 1910 only 70 migrants had remained permanently in the United States.' 45 These findings are even more true of the Mexican
border towns where tens of thousands of Mexicans hold legal resident alien cards,
as well as border visitor or "shopping cards," yet prefer to live on the Mexican side
and commute daily or seasonally to jobs in the American border states. 146 Also,
there are several thousand U.S. citizens of Mexican descent who hold American
47
jobs but who actually live on the Mexican side of the line.
Garcia y Griego, one of the principal authors of the CENIET surveys, has contested criticisms of the CENIET surveys by Census Bureau demographers. He
defended the interview period of December-January because most members of the
household would be home during those months, and thus it could be more accurately determined which members had remained in the United States. Moreover,
he stated that CENIET interviewers generally found that household informants
did not attempt to hide the facts about relatives illegally in the United States.
This finding accords with the experience of other students of Mexican migration.
Garcia y Griego readily conceded that some CENIET findings, such as the fact
that 405,000 legal and illegal Mexican workers were in the United States from
December 1978 to January 1979, are on the low side of the migratory cycle. He
emphasized, however, that the Mexican surveys also established that the average
season-by-season peak for migrant workers abroad, legal or undocumented, for any
year between 1974 and 1979 was 750,000,148 as seen in table 18. The 750,000 cycle
figure also agrees with the Cornelius findings. According to Cornelius and Garcia,
this figure suggests the real size of a rotating migrant flow, mostly undocumented,
between the United States and Mexico for the recent past period. The same
figure, incidentally, has been used in some legislative proposals as the number of
temporary work permits that would be needed to legalize or regularize the annual
49
transborder flow of Mexican migrant workers.
144.

W. CORNELIUS & J. DIAZ CANEDO, supra note 130, at 5-7, 42-43.

145.

Reichert & Massey, Pattersof US Migrationfrom a Mexican Sending Communiy: A Comparison of

Legal and Illegal Afigrants, 13 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 599, 604-06 (1979).
146.
D. NORTH, THE BORDER CROSSERS: PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN MEXICO AND WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES 106-49 (1970) (prepared for the Manpower Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor).

147.

Id at 107-08, 121-25, 137.

148.

CENIET, supra note 49, at 122.

149. See Cornelius, Legalhztng the Flow of Temporary Migrant Workers from Mexico: A Proposal,supra note
132, at 315.
Various bills introduced in both houses of Congress to establish a Mexican temporary worker program
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Although some of the designers of the CENIET surveys seek to influence public
policy on both sides of the border, the surveys themselves are models of academic
objectivity and empirical methodology. 50 However, the "low estimates" of the
CENIET studies, like the "high estimates" of other studies, naturally lend themselves to political use. Those who wish to show, for example, that there is no real
immigration burden from Mexico but only a labor subsidy for the American
economy, or that there is a need for a new Mexican Bracero program, can find
plenty of scientific "facts" in the CENIET surveys.
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the CENIET household surveys is that
countless households from nearly all of Mexico's thirty-two states and territories
that have settled in the United States over the years would hardly have been
reported. After all, there are many areas of Mexico that were not covered by the
CENIET household survey where landless peasants and urban proletarians show
little regret at bidding "Adios" to la madre patria. The visible evidence on the
American side is simply overwhelming. Immigration, police, and educational
authorities, surrounded by a rising tide of Spanish-speaking settlers, commonly
estimate the number of deportable residents, including men, women, and children,
in Los Angeles County alone, to run from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000, with over 75% of
that number thought to be of Mexican origin. There is similar settler evidence in
San Jose, El Paso, San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, Denver, Chicago, Gary, and
many other locales. 15 1 Conjectural estimates aside, community studies show that
since the 1880's, when railroads first linked Mexico to the United States, undocumented or uninspected Mexican workers and their families have continuously
established permanent coloni'as or barrios in American communities which, in turn,
are steadily reinforced and expanded by extended family migration from landless
Mexican villages, or, more recently, from the urban slums of Mexico. 1 52
Nevertheless, the CENIET findings, based on such mammoth and methodical
survey efforts, cannot be taken lightly. While these findings, still in the final stage
of revised processing, may not accurately portray the real size of the accumulated
population of deportable Mexican aliens in the United States, they undoubtedly
were influenced by Cornelius' findings. See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Schmitt on S. Res. 47, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S59-61 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981); see also H. Schmitt, Los Companeros: A Rational
Mexican Migration Policy 14 (1980) (unpublished manuscript prepared with assistance of D.
McCullough).
150. Jorge Bustamante, Director of U.S.-Mexico Border Studies at El Colegio de Mexico, spoke to this
effect at an August 4, 1981 press conference before the National Press Club in Washington on "The
Reagan Administration's Immigration Plan." See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1981, at 18A, col. 1.
Cf 127 CONG. REc. S59-61 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981) (statement of Sen. Schmitt) (concurring in, without
citing, CENIET findings).
151. Interviews with immigration officers, law enforcement authorities, social workers, and other
public officials (Mar. I-Apr. 10 & May i-June 15, 1981).
152. For examples of Mexican settlement studies, see R. Louv, THE MEXICAN MIGRATION:
SOUTHWIND (1980); P. TAYLOR, MEXICAN LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of California Publications in Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1-5, 1928-30; Vol. 7, No. 1-2, 1931-32; Vol. 12, No. 1-3, 1933-34); J. Laird,
Argentine, Kansas: The Evolution of a Mexican-American Community, 1905-1940 (1975) (unpublished
Univ. of Kansas Ph.D. thesis); R. Mines, Las Animas, California: A Case Study of International Network
Village Migration (1980) (unpublished Univ. of California at Berkeley Ph.D. thesis); M. Nazif Shahani,
Immigrant Workers in Winnemucca: A Socio-Cultural Demographic and Economic Assessment (1979)
(unpublished paper available at Reno, Dep't of Anthropology, Univ. of Nevada).
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do provide a solid empirical basis for downward revision of exaggerated estimates
of the rate of illegal Mexican immigration to the United States. Furthermore, they
have already provided the Mexican government planners with a great stock of
data about internal and external migration. Unfortunately, the CENIET surveys
are not well known to American legislators and policymakers, partly due to the
lack of a brief English summary of the principal findings.
VIII
THE

A.

1980

CENSUS

The Politics of the 1980 Census

As the 1980 census year approached, there was still no satisfactory count, or
widely accepted estimate of illegal aliens in the United States. The Carter administration found itself caught between conflicting interest groups. On the one hand,
human rights and ethnic leaders, many of whom were affirmative action appointees to the administration's various advisory staffs for minority affairs, wanted the
full incorporation of all minority residents, legal or otherwise, in the census
count. 153 Given President Carter's political commitments to minorities, and in
view of the upcoming presidential election year, he could hardly ignore such
pressure.
On the other hand, the administration was urged to order a special count of
the illegal population. This pressure came mostly from legislators and restrictionists, some of them members of Carter's own political party, who wanted illegal
residents subtracted from the census total so that this special population would
count neither in political reapportionment, nor in the distribution of federal funds.
Additionally, there were social scientists and demographers who thought that the
Census Bureau should seize the opportunity to do a special count of illegal residents and thereby settle the perplexing question of "how many?"
After high-level consultations involving the politics of the upcoming election
year, Census Bureau officials rejected a special count of illegal aliens as a constitutional, methodological, and political impossibility. First, the Census Bureau was
under a sweeping constitutional mandate to count all persons in the country for
purposes of apportioning political representation in the House of Representatives,
according to the Constitution of 1789, which originally mandated the decennial
census.154 Following the abolition of slavery, the 14th amendment to the Constitution (1868) reinforced the mandate: representatives shall be apportioned among
the several states according to their respective numbers, "counting the whole number of
persons in each state excluding Indians not taxed."'' 55 The Census Bureau has taken
that formula quite literally except in the case of foreign embassy personnel and
153. Lindsey, Brown Power Arrives, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1979, at 6D, col. 5. For President Carter's
commitment to minorities, see A. Corwin, A Human Rights Dilemma, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS:
PERSPECTIVES ON MEXIcAN LABOR MIGRATION 320-46 (1978); Reinhold, Blacks and Hispanics Criticalof

Census, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1979, at 17A, col. 1.
154.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

155.

Id amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
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foreign tourists. 156
Second, Census Bureau officials could not conceive of any methodology by
which a reliable count of furtive illegal residents could be obtained. This view was
supported by the 1978 testimony of demographers before the House Select Committee on Population that there was no accurate way one can count people who
did not want to be counted, 57 as well as the apparent failure of the Reyes residential survey of illegal aliens.' 58
Third, and perhaps most important, the Carter administration decided to
direct the Census Bureau to find as many minority people as possible, particularly
blacks and Hispanics, in order to remedy what were considered political
undercounts of the 1970 census. Leaders of black and brown power
movements
saw the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the key to further electoral gains in the
twenty some states under its oversight jurisdiction. They wanted a fuller count of
minbrity populations, legal or otherwise, within the census itself in order to
broaden gains made under that act. Since the 1975 amendments to the act provided for bilingual voting in communities where census counts show that 5% or
more of the adult voting population are of a foreign language heritage, the Hispanic leaders particularly had an added reason to press for a full count. 59
In addition, minority leaders were interested in a full count because political
counts determine how the "loaves and fishes" would be distributed. Census figures
have become the vital statistics of the welfare state in more than one sense; they
are used in distributing federal funds for social assistance and education programs,
which, in many cases, serve as power bases for ethnic political movements. Here,
the "patronage" stakes alone were enormous. By 1979 some 100 federal programs
60
were distributing nearly $50,000,000,000 annually on the basis of census counts.
Much of this money was categorically marked for disadvantaged minority groups.
Census data--data that included an unknown number of deportable alienswould also be used to set guidelines for equal employment opportunity hiring, job
training programs, educational assistance, including bilingual education, and general revenue sharing.161
Little wonder that census advisory groups sprang up like mushrooms. These
groups included: the Hispanic Advisory Panel, headed by Professor Augustan
Reccio of the University of Miami; the Special Advisory Committee on Spanish
Population, headed by Vilma Martinez, militant director of the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF); the Black Advisory Committee, headed by
156. Some "one person-one vote" decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court relate to the controversial
policy to count illegal aliens for political apportionment. Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Westberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); see also 126 CONG. REC. 32 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Huddleston).
157.
H.R. SELECT COMM. ON POPULATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WORLD POPULATION: MYTHS
AND REALITIES 59-60 (Comm. Print 1978); see also H.R. SELECT COMM. ON POPULATION, 95TH CONG., 2D
SEss., LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES (Comm. Print 1978).

158. Telephone interview with Robert Warren, Researcher, U.S. Census Bureau (Oct. 6, 1981).
159. Crewdson, Houston Hearng Told of Mexican-Amercan Fearson '80 Census, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979,
at 12B, col. 1.
160. Reinhold, supra note 153.
161. Crewdson, supra pote 159.
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the Reverend George Riddick of Operation PUSH in Chicago; and the Special
Census Inquiry Committee, set up by the United States Conference of Mayors,
headed by the black mayor of Atlanta, Maynard Jackson. 162 Minority leaders
made no apologies for exerting influence to shape the census so that it would seek
out minorities. Said Vilma Martinez, "We are trying to get our fair share of polit''
ical influence and federal funds. There's nothing sinister about it. 163
Given the politics of the 1980 census preparations, one can better understand
why Congress gave the Census Bureau $1,000,000,000, a sum four times larger
than the cost of the 1970 census, to achieve the most complete count ever of the
country's population. Furthermore, the Carter administration, in deference to the
demands of the Hispanic Advisory Panel, had the Census Bureau set up a special
recruitment program to hire hundreds of ethnic census-takers familiar with the
neighborhoods and language differences. Since census-taking is commonly seen as
a patronage job by the party in power there was some politicking involved.
Another concession to minority advisers was a multilingual media blitz that
also generated about $38,000,000 worth of "free advertising" to promote census
cooperation. Minority actors, television stars, and celebrities were employed to
assure minority persons that census results would be totally confidential, and to
explain the revenue sharing benefits of full cooperation. 64 Some state governments, such as California, invested their own money in this effort. As a satirical
16 5
cartoonist put it: "Fill in your census form like a good illegal alien, thank you."
A more remarkable concession made by the Carter administration was to
permit Hispanic advisory groups to modify the census questionnaire to encourage
more self-identification of Hispanics. The "Spanish question" appeared for the
first time on the short form to be sent to 80% of American households: "Is this
person's origin or descent Mexican-American, Mexican or Chicano, Puerto Rican,
Cuban, other Spanish, not Spanish." Critics contended that the question was
patently designed to inflate the Hispanic minority counts by encouraging wellassimilated people, who normally would have self-identified as white, to include
themselves in the Hispanic minority count.
What more would Hispanic advisors want in an election year? The Carter
administration, imprisoned by its own human rights rhetoric, fearing for its political future, and beset by its own Hispanic advisory groups, made yet another
extraordinary decision. To promote a bigger count of minorities the administration ordered the U.S. Attorney General to ban all immigration searches for illegal
aliens in residential communities.
On November 26, 1979, over four months prior to the starting of the census on
April 1, 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued a directive discontinuing
community area control investigations by the Immigration Service. After this
directive, immigration officers could knock on a door and investigate reports of
162.
163.

Id
Census Planning to Ask Racial Questions, Des Moines Reg., May 14, 1978, at 13A.

164.
165.

Jackson, Statistical Squabble, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Reinhold, supra note 153.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 1980, at 7 (Oliphant cartoon reproduced from Washington

Star).
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"undocumented aliens" in places of residence only if they suspected such things as
smuggling operations centered in a residence, ill-treatment or physical harm
reportedly being done to undocumented aliens, fugitives misusing a residence for
66
concealment, or Iranian students who had violated American immigration laws.'
Otherwise investigators would need search warrants, the availability of which was
dependent upon detailed information about the identity of suspected illegal residents. According to Mr. Civiletti, himself a civil rights advocate, the administration's decision recognized that: "Accurate counting, so essential to the census,
might be severely handicapped and full census responses chilled by a misperception of resident investigations and apprehensions . ...
On March 28, 1980, Mr. Civiletti made the Carter administration's ultimate
concession to Hispanic advisory groups by ordering a ban on immigration searches
in places of employment unless immigration officers could show a judicial search
warrant based on specific information about the identity of the illegal workers to
be apprehended. Because illegal aliens use a variety of identities, such requirements meant that many work sites, like suspected residences, were no longer normally inspected by immigration officers. 1 68 Because preliminary census results
were assailed as "too low" and emerging lawsuits demanded recounts, the census
bans on interior immigration control were in effect for over thirteen months.
During that period immigration officers, social workers, and school teachers noted
a heavier inflow of illegal alien families into American communities as "the grape' 169
vine spread the word.
The census ban on immigration searches and the media enticement campaign,
both unprecedented in American immigration history, led a critic of the Carter
administration, Senator Huddleston, a Democrat, to observe: "Illegal aliens are,
in effect, being promised temporary immunity from our immigration laws and are
being coached on the benefits that will accrue to their communities . . .in the
form of federal funds if they come forward to be counted."' 170
Finally, on January 15, 1981, the ban on immigration searches at job sites was
lifted. However, the ban on residential searches was left in place by the outgoing
Carter administration, and has been continued by the Reagan administration.
According to district directors of immigration, this residential ban, together with
the chronic lack of immigration manpower, leaves American neighborhoods wide
7
open to settlement by illegal family members.' '
B.

The FAIR Suit and Congressional Efforts to Adjust the Census

In November 1979 the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR),
an organization dedicated to immigration control and equitable immigration
166. Office of Att'y General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, (memorandum to David Crosland, Acting Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Nov. 26, 1979).
167. Id; see also Herman,As Census Nears, the Fears ofSome Are Unrelieved, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1980, at
3B, col. 2.
168. Interviews with immigration officers, supra note 151.
169. Id
170. 126 CONG. REC. S.1984 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1980) (statement of Sen. Huddleston).
171. Corwin,supra note 106.
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quotas, filed a motion in federal district court to stop illegal aliens from being
included in the 1980 Census for purposes of reapportioning congressional electoral
districts, and, implicitly, state and local districts. The Committee for Representative Government, speaking for a number of concerned organizations, joined the
"FAIR suit," and so did twenty-four Congressmen and two Senators, mostly from
states such as Pennsylvania and Illinois, who were concerned about losing seats to
states heavily settled by illegal aliens. The defendants in the suit were the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Census Bureau, the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, and the President of the United States. The constitutional questions raised by the FAIR suit merit special emphasis because they will probably be
raised again in future census conflicts.
The plaintiffs contended that counting illegal aliens for legislative representation violated the constitutional principle of "one man, one vote." Because membership in the House of Representatives is fixed at 435, to count illegal residents
would have the effect of shifting some congressional seats to states with large populations of illegal aliens, such as Texas and California, while diluting political representation in states such as Iowa and Kentucky that have a relatively constant
population size.' 7 2 Moreover, plaintiffs argued that because illegal aliens would
not be voting residents, certain legislators would be representing large nonvoting
populations, just as Congressmen "represented" the Negro population in the
period when that population was denied the vote. Plaintiffs asked for "declaratory
and injunctive relief" that would require the Census Bureau to make the best
effort possible to count illegal aliens separately and exclude them from the apportionment population. 73 The Census Bureau responded that it was constitutionally bound by the 14th amendment to count for apportionment "the whole
number of persons in each state." Furthermore, Census demographers again
insisted that, in any case, an accurate method for counting illegal residents did not
exist, and that any attempt at a separate count would delay the Census by several
months. i 74
New York State and the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund entered the
suit on the side of the defendants. The intervenors argued that any attempt to
count illegal aliens separately or to ascertain their resident status would "alarm the
minority populations" and "inevitably trigger hostility, resentment, and refusal to
cooperate" thus leading to an undercount of the total population for apportioning
and revenue sharing purposes. 175 MALDEF contended that there was no constitutional difference between legal and illegal aliens; both are persons to be counted
for political representation. 176 Earlier, attorneys for the United States Department
of Justice went so far as to say: "Nothing in the Constitution forbids a state from
172. Ferrell & Slade, More Troublefor the Census, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1979, at 7E, col. 4.
173. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.D.C. 1980).
174. Herbers, Census Bureau Bars Shift in '80 Figures, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1980, at 17A, col. 1.
175. 486 F. Supp. at 568.
176. Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, Amicus Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction *and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 10 n.8.
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permitting even illegal aliens from voting for representatives"', 7 7 in state elections.
Actually the three-judge court decided the case on a procedural rather than a
constitutional principle. The procedural question was whether or not the plaintiffs
had established "the indispensible minimum" that "a concrete injury had been
suffered," or would be suffered personally by the party seeking relief. Since no
one could possibly know how many illegal aliens would be present in the census
counts, nor exactly which states might gain or lose representation, the court,
although admitting that a hardship may arise, decided that the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate with requisite specificity where that concrete injury would fall, and so
denied plaintiffs "injunctive relief.' 178 Besides, said the court, "a separate head
count of illegal aliens would be extremely expensive, delay the Census by as much
as a year, and likely be ineffective in any case."' 179 The court, sounding a practical
note, observed that the plaintiffs' suit came too late, "an eleventh hour challenge"
just a few months before the census was to begin on April 1, 1980.180 As critics
commented,
[T]he court placed the plaintiffs in a 'Catch 22' position. A favorable ruling would have
required the Census Bureau to obtain solid information on the number and distribution of
illegal aliens thereby demonstrating a concrete injury. But because the information was not
81
available beforehand the plaintiffs lacked standing to correct that injury.1

In response to the failure of the FAIR suit, Senator Walter D. Huddleston of
Kentucky and others introduced Senate Bill 2366 in January 1980. That bill
would have required the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Census.
Bureau to adjust the total population figures so that illegal aliens would not, be
counted in tabulating population for electoral and revenue sharing purposes. The
sponsors argued that the intent to grant representation to unlawful aliens could
not logically be attributed to the framers of the Constitution; that the concept of
illegal alien was unknown to the Founding Fathers; that there were no illegal
aliens as such until the Act of March 3, 1875 excluded prostitutes and convicts.
"Thus, it was only since 1875 that an individual could have been an 'illegal
alien'." Like the FAIR plaintiffs, the sponsors of S. 2366 contended that the inclusion of illegal aliens defeated the purpose of apportionment and the principle of
82
equal representation.
The exclusion bill went nowhere due to the lack of an actual count of illegal
aliens on which the Census Bureau could base the requested adjustments. Before
giving up, however, some Senators considered a last minute plan to produce such a
count by offering amnesty to a representative sample of illegal alien residents in
exchange for their cooperation. 183
Other legislators made a final try. In August 1980, when census results were
177. Dep't of Justice Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Action or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 10.
178. 486 F. Supp. at 575-77.
179. Id. at 575.
180. Id at 577.
181. 126 CONG. REc. S1984 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1980) (statement of Sen. Huddleston).
182.
d
183. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, Population Specialist, Congressional Research Service,
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widely disputed, the House of Representatives approved an amendment by Congressman Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania and others, to a routine appropriations
bill, that would have forbidden the spending of further public money to count
noncitizens in the census, and would have banned for apportionment purposes the
use of census data containing nonvoting aliens, both legal and illegal.' 84 A companion amendment introduced by Senator Huddleston was approved by the
Senate Appropriations Committee, but for reasons of practicality was allowed to
die in the post-election session of November 1980.185 In any case, senators representing a whole state seem less concerned with reapportionment and redistricting.
C.

Census Bureau Findings: Disputed Numbers As Seen From Fort Apache

Before considering how many residents were missed by the 1980 Census one
should first consider the 1970 Census which found 189,000,000 people but by all
accounts missed a substantial part of the minority populations. For example, in
1979 the Houston area Urban League estimated that the 1970 Census had missed
more than 300,000 persons, mostly minorities, which had resulted in a loss of federal revenue sharing of $6,000,000 or more annually. Similar complaints came
from New York, Chicago, Detroit, and other cities. 18 6 By the Census Bureau's own
estimates, one out of seven Hispanics was missed in 1970, compared to one out of
every thirteen blacks, and one of every fifty whites. 18 7 The Bureau estimated that
it missed about 2.5% of the resident population in 1970, or about 5,300,000 people,
of whom an admittedly disproportionate number were minorities.' 88 (Later the
Bureau revised the undercount to 2.3%.)
With regard to the 1980 Census, Census Director Vincent Barabba assured the
Federal Government that the more elaborate efforts made to find American residents-especially minority residents-had succeeded in eliminating any substantial undercount. Obviously some illegal residents were included in the total, but
no specific figure could be provided because, as had been the case with the 1970
Census, there was no question on the 1980 Census forms that could be used specifically to identify the illegal alien. When the census was completed in early summer
of 1980, the "political position" of census officials was that its total count of
226,500,000 was the most complete Census count ever.
Many big city mayors did not buy the Census Bureau "line." As soon as preliminary results were known, city officials initiated court suits seeking to revise
minority counts upwards. They wanted access to confidential census address regisThe Library of Congress (Sept. 23, 1981); Telephone interview with Jeffrey Passel, Demographer, U.S.
Census Bureau (Sept. 29, 1981).
184.

Census Chief Asks for Appeal to Ruling that Correction Is Made for Undercount, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1980,

at 6, col. 2; Telephone interview with Barnaby Zall, Executive Director, FAIR, Congressional Task Force
(Dec. 8, 198 1).
185. Jackson, Statistical Squabble, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Telephone interview with
member of Sen. Huddleston's staff (Dec. 10, 1981).
186. Crewdson, supra note 159; Fowler, Rehearsalof Census Gets Bad Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1979,
at 24, col. 2.
187. Crewdson, supra note 159; Reinhold, supra note 153.
188. Census ChiefAsks for Appeal to Ruling that Correction Is Madefor Undercount, supra note 184.
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ters to establish their case. 18 9 On September 25, 1980, a federal judge in Detroit,
Horace Gilmore, ordered the Bureau to inflate its official count of blacks and Hispanics before allowing the numbers to be used for dispensing federal aid and political reapportionment. The Bureau said that it was impossible to comply. If it did
so, it would have to inflate arbitrarily every minority figure across the country. 190
Mayor Edward Koch of New York City was one of those filing suit to gain
higher counts. He declared the Federal Government incompetent and hinted that
there was at the head of the Census Bureau a certain Barabbas, a thief (referring to
Census Director Barabba). The Mayor believed that the City stood to lose
$1,500,000 in the 1980's. A federal judge, citing independent surveys that showed
an undercount of 517,000 to 650,000 for New York City and 772,000 to 905,000 for
the State, ordered the Census Bureau to revise its figures upwards. 19'
By December 1980 there were fourteen lawsuits pending against the Census
Bureau. In some of these cases, the judge ordered a restraint on the Bureau's obligation to certify the census results to the President of the United States and the
Clerk of Congress on December 31, 1980.192
In the meantime, Census Bureau officials were holed up in Suitland, MarylancA, in a converted warehouse that "looked more like a desolate army post than
the world's leading statistical mill." Inside, the atmosphere was reportedly "pure
Fort Apache." Beseiged by contempt of court charges, Census Director Barabba
valiantly mounted the ramparts and declared that never in its history had the
193
Bureau surrendered confidential information. He would go to jail first.
Given the circumstances, it is little wonder that Census officials continued to
insist that the 1980 Census was the most complete count ever. Its figure of
226,500,000 for the total population of the United States was presented as being so
close to the true population that the undercount was too small to measure. Later,
Census demographers conceded an undercount but insisted that it was a mere
3,100,000, or 1.4% of the total population, compared'to 2.3% in 1970.194 Mr.
Barabba admitted that some minority groups had been undercounted, but found
such omissions were compensated for by the Bureau's ability to count some of the
illegal residents. 195 Finally, in spite of a ring of lawsuits, the unchanged 1980
Census results were certified and delivered to the President and the Congress on
December 31, 1980. Thereupon, Mr. Barabba stepped down from the ramparts
and joined private business.
For years to come the nation will have to live with the murky ethnic data of the
1980 Census. The self-identification method of counting minorities, instead of the
189. Keeping Secrets, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1980, at 28, col. 1.
190. Jackson, supra note 185.
191. Lubasch,]udge Mandates Census Revision, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1980, at 18A.
192. Herbers, Census Bureau Bans Shift in '80 Figures, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1980, at 17A.
193, Jackson, supra note 185.
On February 22, 1982, the Supreme Court, in a decision that undercuts many census suits, unanimously held that raw census data must remain confidential and refused to review a lower court's ruling
against Detroit's challenge to the census count.
194. Census Chief Asks for Appeal to Ruling that Correction Is Madefor Undercount, supra note 184.
195. Herbers, supra note 192.
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more objective criteria of the 1970 Census which was based on place of birth and
parentage, introduced a more subjective dimension. In effect, every American was
asked to think ethnically or racially. Many persons of mixed ancestry, unable to fit
themselves into the brief list of suggested racial or ethnic categories, listed them96
selves in the catch-all category of "other."'
With respect to the "Spanish question," demographers charged that the term
"other Spanish" would not provide meaningful data on substantial groups such as
the native Hispanics of northern New Mexico, or on immigrant groups like the
Dominicans, Salvadorans, or Colombians. 197 However, Census Bureau demographers believed that information about "other Spanish" could be obtained through
the "long form" mailed to 20% of American households. On that form persons
were asked their country of birth and whether household members born outside
the United States were American citizens. But this information will not be available until long-form information can be processed. This may take many
months. 98 In any event, the subjective ethnic self-identifiers of the 1980 Census
have made it very difficult to compare ethnic data with the 1970 Census.
The "Spanish origin" population in 1970 numbered 9,100,000, or 4.5% of the
national total. According to the 1980 figures, still considered preliminary, people
of "Spanish origin" numbered 14,500,000 or 6.4% of the national population. 99
This remarkable increase may be due to a better count, the "Spanish question,"
high fertility rates, or higher levels of legal and illegal immigration. Of the total
1980 Hispanic population an estimated 60% were of Mexican origin, 14% Puerto
Rican (not counting the Island's population), 8% Central and South American, 6%
Cuban, and 12% other Hispanic. Significantly, Mexican-origin numbers rose from
4,900,000 in 1970 to 8,800,000 in 1980, a gain of 80%.200 By contrast, blacks numbered 22,600,000 in 1970, or 11.1% of the population, and 26,500,000 in 1980, or
20 1
11.7% of the population.
According to Census demographers, a large percentage of Hispanics could
have misunderstood the Census questionnaire. The first question on the short
form had listings for whites, blacks, and twelve Asian, Indian, Native American,
and Pacific Island groups, as well as "other." About 55.6% of the Spanish origin
persons, or 8,100,000 reported as "white," but it is noteworthy that 40%, or
5,800,000, did not report a specific race, but chose "other," with smaller numbers
reporting black (some Dominicans or Puerto Ricans, for example), American
Indian (for example, Navajos with spanish surname), or Asian and Pacific

196. Reinhold, 1980 Census Shows 17% Growth of Blacks Surpassed Rise for US, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1981, at 1, col. 1.
197. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1980 Census Population Totals for Racial and
Spanish Origin Groups I (Public Information Release, CB 81-32, Feb. 23, 1981); cf Reinhold, 'Others'
(Among Others) Play Havoc With Census, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, at 8E, col. 3.
198. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, supra note 183; Telephone interview with Jeffrey Passel,
supra note 183.
199. Herbers, Census Shows Miority Groups Gainingin Bi Cities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1981, at 1, cot. 1.
200. Congressional Hispanic Caucus, Hiipancs in the United States, AVANCE, June 1982, at 3.
201. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 197.
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Islanders (Filipinos with Spanish surname, for instance). 20 2 In any case, the
"other" population grew remarkably from about 500,000 in 1970 to 6,800,000
in
1980, apparently because many Hispanics, including an unknown number of illegals, picked that category, rather than identify themselves as Salvadorans, Colom20 3
bians, Peruvians, Dominicans, or other Latin nationality.
According to 1980 Census findings, Hispanics, who are commonly thought to
compose up to 75% of all illegal residents, had a much younger median age, 23.2,
compared to 24.9 for blacks, and 30 for the population as a whole. Of the
14,600,000 Hispanics counted, 63% were under the age of 30. Such age data seems
to give some clues as to the demographic impact of illegal immigration. For
instance, there were more Hispanic men than women in the age groups 20 to 24
and 25 to 29, "an unusual demographic pattern" according to demographer
Bryant Robey. 2° 4 Another clue was the presence of 50% more Hispanic males in
the 20 to 34 age group than in 1970. Yet the differences in growth rates between
Hispanic men and women disappeared at age 40. This type of data tends to confirm the common visual observation that illegal Hispanic immigration is domi20 5
nated by young men.
No matter how they classified themselves, Hispanics obviously made extraordinary gains in the 1980 Census. Nevertheless, those Hispanic leaders who want
Hispanics to overtake blacks as America's number one minority, had hoped for a
count of 20,000,000 or more, while some Mexican Americans had anticipated a
count of 10,000,000 or 11,000,000 for people of Mexican origin. 20 6 Census Bureau
demographers explain that Hispanic "undercounts" as perceived by Hispanic
leaders, may be in part due to some Hispanic leaders, rejecting any special racial
or ethnic category and identifying themselves as "white." But, more importantly,
many illegal Hispanic residents simply did not report under any category. 20 7
D.

Illegal Aliens in the Census: How Many?

The stubborn fact is that there were no questions on either the short or long
census form from which an alien's legal status could be determined. Thus any
estimate of the illegal resident aliens counted by the census would have to be based
on residual techniques which always involve questionable assumptions. 20 8 In a
supplemental affidavit to the FAIR suit, Lance Tarrance, a population survey
expert, expressed the belief that the Bureau could obtain a residual figure on
illegal residents without confronting delays and added costs from long-form data.
202. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, supra note 198; Telephone interview with Jeffrey Passel,
supra note 198.
203.
Reinhold, supra note 197.
204. Robey, Age in America: 1980 Census Trends, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July/Aug. 1981, at 16.

205.

Id

206. Interview with Herman Baca, Director, Committee on Chicano Rights, Inc., National City, Cal.
(May 11, 1981); Interview with Francisco Garaza, Congressional Liaison, National Council of La Raza
(Aug. 6, 1981); Interview with Rose Marie Salazar, Migration Specialist, Hispanic Secretariat, U.S. Cath-

olic Conference (June 18, 1981).
207. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, supra note 198.
208. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, supra note 198; Telephone interview with Jeffrey Passel,
supra note 198.
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The long form which asked about citizenship status was sent to one-fifth of American households-some 17,000,000 nationwide. Assuming that family members
were fully reported, the Bureau could statistically estimate from that data persons
born outside the United States who were not naturalized citizens. It could then
compare this estimate with a figure based on immigration data for legal aliens.
Subtracting the second figure from the first would lead to an estimated number of
illegal aliens counted by the Census. 20 9 However, the INS does not have accurate
exit records for immigrants; and further, information from the long forms is still
being processed. It may be months before any such estimate can be determined
from this source.
Census Bureau demographers have been using other residual techniques in the
meantime in order to determine the size of the illegal population within the census
count. They have been giving special attention to the Hispanics because this category apparently contains the greatest number of illegal residents. The reported
number of Hispanics increased 5,500,000 between 1970 and 1980. Of this increase
census demographers figure only 1,800,000 can be attributed to natural
increase. 2 10 Another 1,200,000 can be attributed to the net inflow of legal Hispanic immigrants during the decade. 2t ' That would leave 2,500,000 Hispanics to
be accounted for. However, this entire number would not necessarily represent the
number of illegal aliens. It could be the result of better census coverage, or the
result of the "Spanish question" that, in some cases, added persons normally
thought of as "non-Hispanic. '21 2 For instance, in 1970 some 2,400 Filipinos with
Spanish surnames labeled themselves Hispanics; in 1980 some 200,000 did so.
Also, more American Indians in the Southwest with Spanish surnames identified
themselves as Hispanics in 1980.213 Here one reaches a methodological impasse.
Census Bureau demographers are also quietly at work on revising the number
of U.S. residents, including illegal aliens, that may have been missed by the 1980
Census. The revision involves analytic and matching techniques that include U.S.
birth and death rates, immigration and emigration data, and sample survey data
from the current population surveys and the 1980 Census, such as those presently
being used by Robert Warren and Jeffrey Passel. 2 14 The possible undercount has
been raised hypothetically to 2% of the total population of 226,500,000, or approximately 4,500,000. But in the opinion of census experts, there is no known method
for determining what part of that tentative undercount estimate could be illegal
2 15
aliens.
209. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 575 (D.D.C. 1980)
(quoting affidavit of Lance Tarrance, regarding counting of illegal aliens for political representation and
federal-revenue sharing).
210. Robey, supra note 204.
211. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT Table 8
(1980); Interviews with Hispanic leaders, supra note 206.
212. Robey, supra note 204.
213. Robey, supra note 204, at 16, 18.
214. See supra text accompanying note 58.
215. Telephone interview with Dan Melinck, supra note 183; Telephone interview with Jeffrey Passel,
supra note 183.
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Ix
TIME FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION?

What, if anything, should be done about illegal alien residents? In its final
report issued in March 1981, SCIRP recommended a one-time generous amnesty
program for persons who had illegally settled in the United States prior to January
1, 1980.216 In proposing other generous reforms the Commission was influenced by

the conservative estimate of 3,500,000 to 6,000,000 illegals provided by Census
Bureau demographers. 21 7 The Inter-Agency Task Force, appointed in February
1981 by a newly elected Reagan administration, and under the direction of
Attorney General William French Smith, proposed a similar amnesty arrangement
218
using the same cut-off date and the same speculative estimate of illegal aliens.
Under the administration's plan, however, applicants for permanent resident alien
status would have to prove continuous residence in the United States for a period
of ten years, and during that time, as "renewable-term entrants," they could not
21 9
bring in spouses, children, or other dependents.
Many immigration experts, legislators, and INS officials consider the estimate
of 3,500,000 to 6,000,000 to be too low and outdated. 220 However, the Reagan
administration, which incidentally is not clear on whether the estimate refers to an
illegal work force, or covers family dependents as well, is not keenly interested in
higher estimates no matter how plausible. Higher estimates would justify
demands for increased funding for the helpless Immigration Service in a period of
fiscal restraint for all government agencies, and could result in even greater public
opposition to the administration's proposals for mass legalization of foreign
workers and a new temporary labor program for Mexican nationals. With unemployment at crisis level and state and local governments expected to take on
216.

SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-85.

217.

Among the Commission's recommendations were the following: an amnesty program that would

offer legal resident alien status to aliens otherwise admissable who had entered before January 1, 1980; a
raise in the annual ceiling on immigration from 290,000 to 350,000, plus an additional 100,000 visas each
year for five years in order to clear backlogs of visa applicants many of whom were already residing illegally in the United States. And, for the same reason, more immediate relatives of permanent resident
aliens would be allowed to enter under a special worldwide ceiling to be established for that purpose.
SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-48.
218. The Task Force proposed a limited amnesty for illegal workers, but not family members. Apparently the Task Force assumed that most of the estimated illegals were in the labor force. To prevent any,

disruption in certain sectors of the American economy the amnestied alien would enjoy a "renewable
entrant status," which paradoxically would allow the "entrant" to change employers virtually at will.
After a proven ten-year residence, the entrant could apply for a permanent visa.

To help further with the problem of "absorbing" illegal aliens and visa backlogs, Mexico and Canada
would be given a special immigration ceiling of 40,000 per year (not counting immediate relatives), compared to 20,000 for all other countries. The unused Canadian visas would be available to Mexican applicants. Additionally, the Reagan administration would have established an experimental two-year
temporary worker program to help legalize 50,000 Mexican seasonal workers. Presumably the program
could have been expanded to cover several hundred thousand perennial transborder migrants.
219.

Office of Att'y General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Omnibus Immigration Control Act, Title I: Tem-

porary Resident Status for Illegal Aliens (submitted to the President and Congress, Oct. 20, 1981).
220. Interviews with immigration officers, supra note 151; see also Knowing Employment of Illegal Immigrants, 1981. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration and Ref gee Poliy ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciagr,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-98, 218-22 (1981) (statement of Vernon M. Briggs, Cornell Univ. & David S.

North, Director, Center for Labor and Migration Studies).
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increasing social and educational costs related to poverty-stricken immigrants and
refugees from the Third World, the administration was not about to raise the
22 1
illegal alien count.
Congress is presently confronted with a number of bills containing amnesty
provisions, but federal legislators still have no firm residential data on the size, the
ethnic character, or the flow of the illegal alien population. As the U.S. Comptroller General advised Congress:
Given the above situation, legislators will have to, in a sense, make their own estimate of the
undocumented alien population. Legislators may wish to weigh the desirability and feasibility of any proposed actions on both a "best" and "worst" case basis. What may seem
2 million could be inapproright premised on an undocumented alien population of 212 or
2
priate if this population was actually 10 million or more.

Meanwhile, in the face of the great uncertainty about alien numbers and the
American economy, a major bipartisan bill, introduced on March 17, 1982, called
for a sweeping legalization program. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1982, introduced by Senator Alan K. Simpson and Congressman Romano Mazzoli, 2 2 3 makes illegal aliens who have resided continuously in the United States
prior to January 1, 1978, and who have no serious criminal record, eligible for
permanent immigrant status, for social assistance, and for the right to petition for
the admission of relatives. After five years they become eligible to apply for naturalization and the right to bring in immediate relatives with no wait. Illegal aliens
who entered between January 1, 1978 and January 1, 1980, may apply for "Temporary Resident" status which carries no social entitlements except health care,
but which provides the legal right to seek any kind of employment. After two
years they become eligible to apply for permanent residence with entitlements if
they can demonstrate a minimal knowledge of English. Aliens who entered after
January 1, 1980 would be considered "deportable." There are also accompanying
provisions aimed at future immigration control included in the bill.
In considering amnesty proposals Congress must consider the question of how
many aliens might be legalized under a given cut-off date, such as 1980 or 1982. It
is equally important to consider the potential multiplier effects: How many mil221. Another fitting comment on the politics of numbers is that the Governor of Texas, Bill Clements,
decided to attempt his own residential survey of illegal Mexican aliens in Texas. He planned to use the
figures in the Supreme Court case involving undocumented children in Texas public schools and in an
attempt to convince the federal government to institute a "guest worker" program for border migration
control according to Memorandum of October 23, 1981, from the State of Texas Office of State-Federal
Relations, Wash., D.C.; Hearings on H-2 Workers and Non-Immigrants Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Refugee Pohc of the Senate Comm. on the Judctiay, 97TH CONG., IST. SESS. (1981) (Gov. Clements testifying).
222. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, NUMBER OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS RESIDING IN THE
UNITED STATES UNKNOWN: REPORT 4 (1981).
223. Among other things the Simpson/Mazzoli bill, Immigration, Reform and Control Act of 1982, S.
2222, H.R. 6514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); would establish the following: a fixed annual cap on immigrant admissions of 425,000, but not including refugees; civil sanctions for employers of illegal aliens; a new
identification system for all job applicants; stiff penalties for persons engaged in bringing in aliens not
authorized to enter the United States; a higher immigration ceiling of 40,000 for Mexico and the same for
Canada, with an understanding that unused Canadian visas would go to Mexican applicants, wghile all
other countries would be limited to 20,000; expedited procedures for handling asylum and depbrtation
cases, and for bringing in temporary foreign workers mainly for agricultural employment. The- bill was
reintroduced in 1983 by Senator Simpson and Congressman Mazzoli.
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lions of immigrant visa petitions would be generated by legalized aliens? How
many visa petitioners would come in anyway as tourists and visitors while waiting
for restricted visa numbers? How many legalized aliens and their dependents
would go on social assistance and minority entitlements programs? Taken
together such questions pose an amnesty dilemma.
Meanwhile, as 1983 opened a persistent economic recession was sending unemployment rates to well over 10% of the national labor force. The Immigration
Service was expected to protect jobs for Americans, but received little help from a
budget-cutting administration. Until some action is taken, illegal entrants and
overstay visitors will continue to enter the country almost at will through hurried
visa services, through poorly inspected airport terminals, and through poorly
guarded land borders. 224 It is clear that the numbers game will be around for a
long time to come.

224. An understaffed and underfunded Immigration Service, far behind in processing papers, has no
idea how many of the millions of foreign visitors (who entered on 1-94 forms) actually leave the United
States. See, e.g., 20 Million Lost in US Maze, Chicago Trib., Nov. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.; see also supra text
accompanying notes 25, 34.
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APPENDIX A
DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED, ALIENS DEPORTED, AND ALIENS

REQUIRED TO DEPART YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1892-1976,
JULY-SEPTEMBER

1976

SEPTEMBER 30,

AND YEARS ENDED

1977-1982

Deportable
PERIOD

Aliens Located
(Arrested) I

Aliens Formally
Deported

Aliens required
2
to Depart

1892-1978 ........

13,195,175

777,483

12,416,140

72,233

........
........
........
........

128,484

3,127
11,558
27,912
92,157

1931-1940 ........

147,457

117,086

93,330

1941-1950 ........

1,377,210

110,849

1,470,925

11,294
11,784
11,175
31,174
69,164
99,591
193,657
192,779
288,253
468,339

4,407
3,709
4,207
7,179
11,270
14,375
18,663
20,371
20,040
6,628

6,531
6,904
11,947
32,270
69,490
101,945
195,880
197,184
276,297
572,477

3,598,949

129,887

3,883,660

509,040
543,5353
885,587
1,089,583
254,096

13,544
20,181
19,845
26,951
15,028

673,169
703,778
885,391
1,074,277
232,769

1892-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........

1951-1960 ........
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

...........
...........
...........
...........

1956 ...........
1957 ...........

87,696
59,918

7,297
5,082

80,891
63,379

1958 ...........
1959 ...........

53,474
45,336

7,142
7,988

60,600
56,610

1960 ...........

70,684

6,829

52,796

1961-1970 ........

1,608,356

96,374

1,334,528

1961 ...........

88,823

7,438

52,383

1962 ...........

92,758

7,637

54,164

1963 ...........

88,712

7,454

69,392

1964 ...........

86,597

8,746

73,042

...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........

110,371
138,520
161,608
212,057
283,557
345,353

95,263
123,683
142,343
179,952
240,958
303,348

1971-1980 ........

8,321,498

10,143
9,168
9,260
9,130
10,505
16,893
231,694

7,246,812

420,126
505,949

17,639
16,266

370,074
450,927

655,968

16,842

568,005

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

1971 ..........
1972 ...........

1973 ...........

.
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1974 ...........
1975 ...........

788,145
766,600

18,824
23,438

718,740
655,814

1976 ...........

875,915

27,998

765,094

1976 TQ .......

221,824

8,927

190,280

1977
1978
1979
1980

............
...........
...........
...........

1,042,215
1,057,977
1,076,418
910,361

30,228
28,371
25,888
17,2734

867,015
975,515
966,137
719,211

1981 ...........
1982 ...........

975,780
962,687

16,6544
14,154

820,946
809,577

1. Aliens apprehended first recorded in 1925. Prior to 1960, represents total aliens actually
apprehended. Since 1960, figures are for total deportable aliens located (arrested), including
nonwillful crewmen violators.
2. Aliens required to depart as "non-penalty voluntary departures", first recorded in 1927.
3. Adjustment made for 1952.
4. Drop due to personnel shortages and special details for Cuban/Haitan entrants.
TQ equals 3 months. Fiscal year changed from June 30, to September 30.
1980 drop in apprehensions due to ban on certain immigration control operations during the
Census period, November 26, 1979 to January 15, 1981. Drop in 1982 partly due to high U.S.
unemployment rates of around 10%.
Note:

SoUrCe:

In recent years about 87% to 90% of apprehensions have been Mexican nationals, mainly
because the Immigration Service concentrates enforcement efforts more on the states
bordering Mexico. Arrest figures for Mexican nationals will probably rise sharply in fiscal
1983 due to Mexico's severe financial crisis.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT Table

30 (1979); Data from Statistical Office, Central Office, INS.

Page 223: Spring 1982]

THE NUMBERS GAME

APPENDIX

INS

B

STAFFING LEVELS

The outgoing Carter administration, which had done little about immigration
and refugee control, recommended an Immigration Service budget of
$385,000,000 for fiscal 1982, compared to a working budget of $371,500,000 for
fiscal 1981. Given the 10% annual rate of inflation, the proposed increase was
actually a substantial cut in INS resources and personnel.
When the Reagan team took over early in 1981, it was largely ignorant about
the seriousness of immigration affairs. Before coming to Washington, administration study groups had labored on a range of conservative policy reforms but not
specifically on immigration and refugee problems. The new administration, dedicated to reducing the size of the federal bureaucracy, was determined to spare no
federal agency from budget cuts. At first, the President's Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) slashed $21,600,000 and 973 positions from the INS budget as
proposed by the Carter administration! That would have left the INS with a fiscal
1982 budget of $363,400,000 and a permanent staffing level of only 9,531 positions-approximately its 1977 level of budget and personnel.
The Reagan administration soon learned, however, that it had inherited a
colossal immigration and refugee mess, plus a formidable list of reform recommendations from the distinguished Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy. The response of the new administration was to set up an inter-agency task
force, under Attorney General William French Smith, to study policy responses.
Although Mr. Smith came to Washington innocent about immigration enforcement needs, after listening to budget proposals from his own immigration agency
and confronting embarrasing questions from Congress, he urged the White House
to give higher priority to immigration and refugee control problems, particularly
in south Florida. At the same time, the Senate and House appropriation committees, which were more aware of public demands for migration control than the
OMB, worked not only to restore the Immigration Service cuts proposed by the
Reagan administration, but to substantially increase funding and personnel over
the 1981 level.
As a result the INS budget authorization of $428,500,000 for fiscal 1982 was
$65,000,000 over what the administration had first proposed. The funding
increase was accompanied by staff increase of 1,073 permanent positions over the
administration's first proposal, giving the INS a total staff of 10,604 for fiscal 1982,
plus about 852 "work years" for nonpermanent employees and added costs related
to permanent employees.
In view of the fiscal restraints the administration put on nearly all government
agencies (except the Pentagon) the final fiscal 1982 budget for the INS represented
a remarkable concession to the needs of the Immigration Service. Unfortunately,
the 1982 budget distribution actually left less funding available for enforcement at
major points of illegal entry and for keeping illegal aliens out of the American job
market. Under heavy political pressure to "save Florida," the administration allot
cated over $40,000,000 of the 1982 INS budget increase to cover costly detention
programs and case-by-case asylum hearings related mostly to Cuban refugee "mis-
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fits" and illegal Haitian "boat people." This allocation was made even though the
Caribbean refugee problem was numerically insignificant compared to the massive
number of illegal and mala fide entries on the southern land border and through
superficially inspected airports.
The INS also lost some enforcement positions in 1982. In spite of a critical
shortage of inspectors and investigators, the administration reduced these positions
by 202 and 190, respectively, leaving a token force of about 1350 field inspectors to
cover some 430 ports-of-entry (many of them open twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week) and 725 investigators for interior immigration control throughout the
United States. By contrast, in 1976, when the INS was already pathetically
undermanned, there were in the field around 1,400 inspectors and over 800 investigators. Personnel levels in both Adjudications and Status Verifications were also
cut. In Adjudications, where staff was needed to process a huge backlog of claims
and petitions, 195 positions were cut. In Status Verifications, where staff members
winnow out fraudulent documents and statements, 91 positions were lost. This left
staff totals of 575 and 162, respectively, for fiscal 1982.
On the other hand, the Border Patrol was slightly increased in fiscal 1982 by 54
positions above the congressional authorization, giving it a total authorized force
of 2,694. Not all of those positions may be funded, however. Currently, under
normal operating procedures, the Border Patrol can allocate only about 450 men
to any given eight-hour shift on the Mexican border. That border stretches some
1,900 miles. Rather than affording some slight improvement to the problems of
border coverage, this small increase in staff size was more than offset by the extensive use of border patrolmen as detention officers in centers where Haitians are
held pending review of asylum claims. Relatedly, the number of detention and
deportation officers was enlarged by 232, but again, this was done mainly to allow
the detention of Haitian "boat refugees" in order to stem any future Caribbean
"refugee" flows.
The INS continuing resolution for fiscal 1983 was $495.7 million, including the
,anticipated pay raise, with a total authorized personnel of 10,483, plus about 671
"work years" for no npermanent employees, and added costs such as overtime. At
the beginning of fiscal 1983, the total on-duty enforcement personnel was as follows: 1355 inspectors, 888 investigators, and 2504 border patrol officers. In weighing the total amount of the 1983 budget one should bear in mind that, again, a
large part of the same, $27.2 million, was destined for the reception, processing,
and care of Cuban and Haitian entrants.
Thus far, the Reagan administration has concentrated mostly on a refugee
deterrent policy for south Florida while it hoped for congressional approval of its
Omnibus Immigration Control Act submitted to Congress on October 20, 1981.
This act proposed civil sanctions for employers who hire three or more illegal
aliens and other preventive measures. Meanwhile, however, the ability of the
Immigration Service to apply existing preventive-measures to illegal entrants has
actually been further diminished by the Reagan administration. Further, the
administration has made no provision to add public service personnel to the INS.
Consequently, it is expected that the "service mess" at most immigration offices
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will continue. More serious, the administration, in 1982 and 1983, was caught
undermanned and flatfooted by an exodus over the southwestern border of
undocumented Mexican naturals fleeing Mexico's current financial crisis.
-

Sources: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1982, H.R. REP.

No. 105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21 (1981); Chaze & Migdail, Invasionfrom Mexto-t Just Keeps Growing,
U.S NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 7, 1983, at 37, 37-44; Kelly, The Great Amercan Immigration Aightmare, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REP., June 22, 1981, at 27, 27-32; Pear, It's Timefor Immigration Law Reform-Or Is It?,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1982 (contains a handy resume of the Administration's proposals for immigration
control and the prospects for congressional approval); Letter from Michael G. Harpold, President,
National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council of the American Federation of Government
Employees, to Congressman Romano Mazzoli, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law (Nov. 4, 1981); Memorandum from Peter Regis, Legislative Assistant, to
Chairman Mazzoli on Summary of Fiscal Year 1982 Revised Budget Request (Nov. 2, 1981); Data from
INS Budget Office, Central Office (Jan. 21-22, 1982; Feb. 1983).
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INS:

STAFFING LEVELS AND CEILINGS SINCE FISCAL YEAR

1977

Fiscal Year
1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Authorized full-time
permanent positions

9,472

10,071

b10,997

c10,943

d10,886

10,619

h10,483

Actual end of year
Full-time permanent

8,812

9,859

9,695

9,993

a9,786

9,957

9,950

f

f

f

f

gl,545

1,391

i1,805

11,331

11,348

11,755

Other than full-time
permanent
Total
OMB ceiling end of year
Full-time permanent
Other than full-time
permanent

9,046

9,827

10,110

10,445

9,739

9,964

731

731

678

729

682

696

10,423
10,660
11,174
10,558
10,788
9,777
Total
aActual on-board strength as of April 4, 1981.
b495 positions were not allocated in FY 1979 in anticipation of an equivalent cut in FY 1980.
c227 positions were not allocated in FY 1980 in anticipation of an equivalent cut in FY 1981.
d170 positions were not allocated in FY 1981. The $6 million saved, according to INS, was used to fund
the pay raise.
ePositions are for the pay period nearest the end of the fiscal year for which data was available.
fData not readily available.
gOn-duty as of April 18, 1981.
hJudicial review program (136 positions) dropped.
iAs of 12/25/82.
JData no longer available due to a change in report format.
Source: Letter from Clifford I. Gould, Director of U.S. General Accounting Office, to Congresswoman
Geraldine A. Ferraro, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Human Resources (Aug. 20, 1981).
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APPENDIX C
AMERICAN CONSULAR POSITIONS AND CASELOADS
1975
1980
1975

Consular positions

563

(Foreign national Positions:

1,593)*

Consular positions
(Foreign national positions:

1,843)

696

Immigrant visas issued:
Immigrant visas refused:

304,000
91,000

CASELOAD: Subtotal
Nonimmigrant visas issued:
Nonimmigrant visas refused:

3,330,00
331,000

CASELOAD:

1975, 1980

395,000

Subtotal

3,661,000

1975 CASELOAD T 0 T A L ..................................
1980

Immigrant visas issued:
Immigrant visas refused:

333,000
110,000

CASELOAD: Subtotal
Nonimmigrant visas issued:
Nonimmigrant visas refused:
CASELOAD:

4,046,000

443,000
6,735,000
583,000

Subtotal

7,318,000

1980 CASELOAD T O T A L .....................................
7,761,000
In smaller American consulates overseas persons occupying foreign national positions sometimes do consular work.
TRAINING FOR FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS:
6.5
5
2
20-24
Source:

weeks basic training at Foreign Service
weeks consular training, including visa,
weeks consultation training at "country
observes, consults as "apprentice".
weeks language training in one specific
language at overseas post.

Institute, Rosslyn, Virginia
and all services at FSI.
desk" of Department of State, reads,
language at FSI, and continues to study

Mike Hancock, Executive Office, Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 27, 1981).
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ESTIMATES OF ALIENS ILLEGALLY RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES FOR

VARIOUS DATES IN THE 1970s
Date of
Estimate
1970
1973

Estimate
(in millions)
1.6
3.9
(2.9 - 5.7)

1975

8.2

1975

0.6 - 4.7

1975

0.4 - 1.2

1975

5.5 - 6.0

1975

0.5

1977

0.7 - 2.2

1978
1978
1978-79
(Dec.Jan.)
1978

3-6
1.1 - 4.1
0.4

3.5 - 6

1978

.6

1979

1.1

Comments

Mexican-origin population only
Ages 18 to 44 only. The numbers in
parentheses represent rough 68-percent
confidence limits
The Lesko report also contains an estimate of
5.2 million for the Mexican-origin population
Illegal white male population, ages 20 to 44
only
Net illegal immigration of Mexican-origin
population, 1970-75
Survey by districts. Rough estimates by
experienced immigration officers
Annual flow estimate. Fraudulent entrants
study of Mexican border ports and major
international airports
Mexican-origin population only

Total population, ages 20 to 44
Seasonal flow estimate. Mexican nationals
over 15 years of age working or looking for
work, without regard to legal status
Speculative estimate of illegal alien
population, based on methodological
assessment of other studies listed
Speculative estimate of net annual inflow of
long-term illegal workers, 75% Mexican
Analytic estimate of Census-counted illegal
residents who entered 1970 to November
1979, includes estimate of 734,000 Mexicans

Source and
Publication Date
Goldberg (1974)
Lancaster and
Scheuren (1978)
Lesko Associates
(1975)
Robinson (1980)
Heer (1979)
U.S. Immigration
Service, Commissioner
Chapman (1975)
U.S. Immigration
Service, Commissioner
Chapman (1976)
Reestimation of
Mexico CENIET
(1979a) by U.S.
Census Bureau
Castillo, INS (1978)
Robinson (1981)
Mexico, CENIET
(1979b) National
Survey of Emigration
Siegel, Passel, and
Robinson, Census
Bureau (1980)
Edwin P. Reubens
(1980)
Robert Warren,
Census Bureau (1981)

Source: Adapted from Siegel, Passel & Robinson, Preliminary 4yeview of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal
Residents in the United States, U.S. IMIMIGKATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
APPENDIX E TO STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, UNITED
STATES

13 (1980).

